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1 Introduction
There is a large literature on scal federalism which focuses on the optimal allocation of powers between
the central and local governments. The "Decentralization Theorem" of Oates (1972) states that the choice
of a centralized system over a decentralized one depends on the benets of internalizing externalities
relative to the costs of policy uniformity. Recently, this trade-o¤ has been re-examined from a political
economy perspective with the result that centralization may not be the most e¢ cient system even though
centralized policy can be di¤erentiated across localities.
A potential deciency of a centralized system is that the costs of local public spending are shared
through a common budget, thus creating a conict of interest between citizens in di¤erent localities. For
instance, Besley and Coate (2003) develop a two-region model of local public spending and show that,
with a cooperative legislature, each median voter has an incentive to strategically delegate bargaining
power to a representative with higher demand for public spending. The reason is that the appointment
of a liberal representative is a commitment device to extract more of the common budget, which in
turn results in too much public spending.1 Their analysis has been extended in several directions. In
particular, Dur and Roelfsema (2005) consider that some costs cannot be shared across regions and then
focus on the nancing rules that eliminate the incentives for strategic delegation under a cooperative
legislature.
In the literature on the political economy of scal (de)centralization, it is typically assumed that
there are no strategic interactions among regions or that the total amount of public good consumption
available in a particular region corresponds to a weighted sum of the amounts that are locally provided by
all regions with the weights reecting the spillovers across regions. This summation technologyimplies
perfectsubstitutability between local public investments and it originates from the canonical model of
private provision of a pure public good, where the goods overall level is dened as the arithmetic sum of
individual contributions (see Bergstrom et al., 1986).
However, as rst pointed out by Hirshleifer (1983), public goods can take a variety of di¤erent forms for
which the perfect-substitutes assumption is questionable. He then proposed two other social composition
functionsfor aggregating individual contributions. With the weakest-linktechnology, the total level of
public good is given by the smallest individual contribution, while it is given by the greatest contribution
for the best-shottechnology. In the rst case, Hirshleifer (1983) used the example of a circular island
that needs to be protected by a dike and for which the e¤ective level of protection (against oods) is
determined by the lowest portion of the dike. For best-shot public goods, one can think of discovering a
research breakthrough e.g. a cure for a degenerative disease where the payo¤ is determined by the
greatest research e¤ort.
Cornes (1993) and more recently Cornes and Hartley (2007a) went one step further by considering
1 In fact, strategic delegation can nullify any element of cooperativeness within the legislature (see Cheikbossian, 2000).
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a CES social composition functionfor aggregating individual contributions. Such a technology allows
them to consider the intermediate cases of weaker-linkand better-shotpublic goods. For example,
in the case of a weaker-linkpublic good, the smallest contribution has the largest marginal impact on
the overall level of public good provision but the impact of contributions by others is not equal to zero
(due, for example, to di¤erences in the islands topography in Hirshleifers example). Sandler (1997,
1998) and Arce and Sandler (2001) pointed out that these types of public goods may also be prevalent
in many situations involving the provision of transnationalpublic goods stemming from regional public
investments, with spillover e¤ects from one region to the other. By way of illustration of transnational
weaker-linkpublic goods, they briey refer to the cases of atmospheric monitoring, cyberspace virus
control, disease control or peacekeeping.2
In the present analysis, we revisit the issue of the (de)centralization provision of local public goods
from a political economy perspective, with the use of a framework that allows for any degree of sub-
stitutability/complementarity between local public investments as well as for any degree of public good
spillovers. More specically, we consider a model with two regions, each providing a local public good
that benets the other region. The e¤ective level of public good consumption in each region results
from a CES aggregation function of public investments in the two regions. Furthermore, we introduce
spillover e¤ects by weighting foreign public investment by an exogenous parameter and, so, one unit of
public investment abroad does not entail the same marginal public benet than when this unit is provided
domestically.
The (de)centralization of decision-making is framed by a two-stage policy game. In the rst stage,
voters in each region elect by majority voting a representative. In the second stage, the elected local
representatives choose independently of each other the level of public investment for their own region
in case of decentralized decision-making. Under centralization, however, the two representatives choose
local public investments so as to maximize joint surplus. We also assume in this case that local public
spending can be funded by both a common lump-sum tax and by a local tax within a range between
purecommon nancing and purelocal nancing. Finally, in our analysis, median voters are decisive
and have exactly the same preferences so that we focus exclusively on symmetric equilibria.
The degree of substitutability/complementarity between local public investments relative to the elas-
ticity of the marginal valuation for total public good consumption determine whether local public invest-
ments are strategic substitutes or complements. We then show that, under decentralization, each median
voter strategically delegates policy to a representative with a lower (respectively higher) taste parameter
for public good consumption than herself as local public goods are strategic substitutes (respectively
2 Interestingly, they state that "weaker-link public goods resemble strategic complements" (p. 497). For better-shot
public goods, they briey refer to the cases of the development of a vaccine or public policies against international terrorism.
They conclude that "better-shot public goods are akin to strategic substitutes" (p. 497). However, they do not analyze the
nature of strategic interactions between countries as a function of the type of public good. Instead, they analyze correlated
strategies for specic numerical examples of weaker-linkand better-shottransnational public goods.
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complements). In any case, there is underprovision of local public goods under a decentralized system
and consequently the delegation process may accentuate or mitigate the free-rider problem in public good
provision. Under centralization, however, median votersincentives to delegate policy to a conservative
or to a liberal representative depend only on the share of common funding of local public spending
relative to the size of the spillover e¤ects. Depending on which case applies, centralized decision-making
results in over or under-spending, but the drawback of centralization is decreasing in the degree of com-
plementarity between local public goods. Finally, we analyze which system dominates the other from the
median voterspoint of view. For example, under pure centralizationwith a common budget nancing
rule, we show that centralization dominates decentralization if and only if both the spillover parameter
and the degree of complementarity between local public investments are both relatively large.
Our results contribute to the previous traditional and political-economy literatures on the (de)centralization
provision of local public goods. Besley and Coate (2003) show that centralized provision is preferable
to decentralized provision if spillover e¤ects are su¢ ciently strong. The conclusion is thus the same as
in the standard approach à la Oates (1972), with the di¤erence that the costs of centralization result
from over-spending decisions due to the appointment of liberalrepresentatives in the central legislature.
Dur and Roelfsema (2005) consider that some costs cannot be shared though a common budget, so that
the strategic delegation to conservativeagents under centralization may also happen. An important
feature of these two papers, and of a number of other studies, is that there are no incentives for strategic
delegation under decentralized decision-making. The reason is that voterspreferences are separable in
the levels of public spending, thus implying that the two regionsallocations are strategically neutral
(even though there exists spillover e¤ects).3
However, Dur and Roelfsema (2005), in an additional appendix, also consider a summation technol-
ogywith the public good surplus being given by a (concave) function of the weighed sum of local public
goods.4 This implies that these investments are strategic substitutes and, hence, median voters strategi-
cally delegate power to conservativerepresentatives under non-cooperative decision-making. However,
they do not investigate the relative performance of the two systems with this extension. In fact, we
show that local public investments must not be perfect substitutes for a centralized system to possibly
dominate a decentralized system even though there are large public good spillover e¤ects.
In other words, the trade-o¤ identied by Besley and Coate (2003) and others crucially hinges
on the separability assumption of local public goods in the utility of voters. This is a very restrictive
3Due to its convenience, this separability assumption has been extensively used in the political economy literature of
(de)centralization to investigate a number of issues such as lobbying (see, e.g., Lockwood, 2008), the popular support for
centralization (see, e.g., Feld et al., 2008; Feidler and Staal, 2012), or the endogenous choice of the degree of centralization
(see, Lorz and Willmann, 2005, 2013).
4This corresponds to the standard alternative specication which has also been used to study, for example, the impact
of voting rules, such as direct referendum or qualied majority, on the emergence and scope of centralized systems (see,
e.g., Redoano and Scharf, 2004; and Alesina et al., 2005); or the e¤ect of lobbying on the performance of a decentralized
system (see, e.g., Cheikbossian, 2008).
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assumption which is unlikely to be satised in a wide variety of contexts. In fact, a number of studies
show that there do exist strategic interactions between neighboring jurisdictions. While, most papers
focus on the strategic interactions in tax rates, there is a growing body of empirical works that focus on
public spending interactions and that conclude, in general, to the presence of a strategic complementarity
(see, e.g., Case et al., 1993; Figlio et al., 1999; Baicker, 2005; Foucault et al., 2008).
Our paper is also related to the literature that focuses on the votersincentives for delegating decision-
making to representatives in the context of environmental policies. For example, Buchholz et al. (2005)
show that median voters support representatives that are less greenthan they are, both under coop-
erative (centralized) and non-cooperative (decentralized) decision-making. In a strategic trade policy
environment à la Brander and Spencer (1985), Roelfsema (2007) raises the possibility of delegating pol-
icy to an environmental loverin case the median voter cares su¢ ciently for the environment. Yet, in
a similar manner to the above-mentioned articles, the public bad i.e. the environmental damage is
modelled as a function of the (weighted) sum of domestic polluting activities.
Last but not least, the use of a more general social composition function raises some technical
problems in this kind of two-stage political game. The standard equilibrium concept would be that of a
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in pure strategies. Yet, in the present study, the existence
issue is hard to deal with under this notion, except under very specic assumptions.5 Indeed, while
representatives payo¤s are concave in their own strategies, the payo¤s of the decisive voters induced
by the public good provision subgame between representatives are seemingly not (quasi-)concave, nor is
the induced game necessarily supermodular for all the parameter values. Therefore, we introduce the
weaker equilibrium concept of a Local Nash Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (LNSPE), which ensures that
no median voter benets from a small unilateral deviation from her equilibrium strategy. This concept
extends to a two-stage game that of a Second-order Locally Consistent Equilibrium (2-LCE) or that
of a Local Nash Equilibrium (LNE) in static models of imperfect competition (see, Gary-Bobo, 1989;
Bonanno 1998). This notion of local equilibriumhas also been exploited in models of tax competition,
where the existence of a Nash equilibrium remains an issue (see, e.g., Bayindir-Upmann and Ziad, 2005;
Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006).6
5 In models à la Besley and Coate (2003) or Dur and Roelfsema (2005), which can be recovered as (two) cases of our
framework, a SPNE always exists. We can also show that such an equilibrium exists under a decentralized system when
local public investment are strategic complements (but not too complements). For more details, see the additional appendix,
which is available upon request.
6 In this literature, most authors just assume the existence of a (general) Nash equilibrium and few of them have explicitly
focused on the existence problem (see, e.g., Laussel and Le Breton, 1998; Rothstein, 2007). More closely related to the
present analysis, Persson and Tabellini (1992) analyze tax competition between two countries and where the policy-maker,
in each country, is elected by majority voting. It is thus a two-stage game with strategic delegation e¤ects. However,
they implicitly assume the existence of an equilibrium by focusing on the rst-order conditions only. This practice is also
common in the literature on strategic trade policy with governments choosing (non-cooperatively) their trade policies prior
to the time that rms engage in market competition (see, e.g., Brander and Spencer, 1985; Eaton and Grossman, 1986).
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The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the framework for our analysis.
Sections 3 and 4 present our political economy analysis of a decentralized and a centralized system,
respectively. In Section 5, we evaluate the performance of one system relative to the other and we also
compare in details our results with those of previous studies. Finally, Section 6 o¤ers some concluding
remarks.
2 The Model
Consider an economy of two equally sized regions, indexed by j = A;B, with the region size normalized to
1. There are three goods in the economy, a private good x and two local public goods or investments eA
and eB ; each one associated with a particular region. All individuals have identical endowments in private
goods y and producing one unit of local public good ej costs one unit of the private good. There are two
additional important features in the model. First, the total amount of public good consumption in region
j does not coincide with the amount locally provided because of the existence of cross-regional spillovers.
Second, the two local public goods can be substitutes or complements. Specically, the e¤ective level of
public good consumption in region j, for a given vector of local public investments e  (ej ; e j) 2 <2+, is
given by
Gj (e) =

e1 j + e
1 
 j
 1
1  : (1)
 2 [0; 1] represents the spillover parameter and the two special cases where  = 0 and  = 1 corre-
spond, respectively, to the two polar cases of pure local public goodsand pure global public goods(also
referred to as the case of perfect spillovers).7  2 f[0; 1) [ (1;+1)g measures the degree of complemen-
tarity between the two local public goods and the elasticity of substitution is 1=. For  = 0, we have
perfect substitutabilitybetween local public goods and equation (1) becomes the standard summation
technology, i.e. Gj = ej + e j .8 For  ! +1 we have perfect complementarityand, in the limit,
equation (1) becomes Gj =Minfej ; e jg (referred as to the weakest-linkfunction). Finally, if  > 1 and
ej = 0 or e j = 0, the function is not well dened. Hence, we will also take the limit of (1) as ej ! 0 or
e j ! 0, which means Gj (e) = 0 in this case.9
7Because of the spillover parameter, there are two levels of e¤ective public good consumption hence two di¤erent CES
social composition functionsone for each region. For this reason, our model does not belong to the class of "aggregative
games", where each players payo¤ depends on her own action and the same aggregate of all playersactions (see, Corchón,
1994; Cornes and Hartley, 2007a, 2007b; and Acemoglu and Jensen, 2013).
8The denomination of perfect-substitutesfor  = 0 is actually abusive. Indeed, even in this case, one unit of investment
abroad does not entail the same marginal benet than when this unit is provided domestically because of the spillover
parameter. So, the adjective perfectmust be understood as referring to an innite elasticity of substitution between the
two levels of public investments.
9Note that (1) is also discontinuous at  = 1. This case is excluded from our analysis.
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Individuals di¤er in the intensity of their preferences for public good consumption. The preferences
of a citizen in region j with taste parameter  are given by
xj + F [Gj (e)] ; (2)
where  is symmetrically distributed over the

; 

interval with  > 0, and with the mean and median
values both equal to mj for region j (for j = A;B). Furthermore, F (:) is increasing and concave with
constant index of concavity  =  [F 00 (Gj (e)) :Gj (e)]=F 0 (Gj (e)). F (:) is thus an isoelastic function of
the form F (Gj (e)) = [Gj (e)]
1 , where  2 (0; 1).10
In each region, the cost of providing the local public good is nanced by a uniform head tax  j on
local residents of region j. We will assume throughout that citizensendowments in private goods y are
su¢ ciently high to always allow positive consumption of the private good x. There are thus no wealth
e¤ects and, so, we can focus on the public good surplus.
3 Decentralization
Under decentralization, the level of local public investment in region j is decided by an elected (regional)
representative and is nanced by local taxation only, so that the uniform head tax in region j is such that
 j = ej . The representative is chosen by and amongst the voters of the region. Thus, we have a two-stage
policy game to solve. In the rst stage, voters in each region elect their representative by majority rule.
In the second stage, the two representatives simultaneously choose the level of public spending for their
own region.
We work by backward induction. Let the type of the elected representative in region j be j . Given
the other representatives policy choice e j , the representative of region j chooses ej  0 to maximize
her own public good surplus
vj (e) = jF [Gj (e)]  ej : (3)
We rst establish the following Lemma, which will prove useful in further analysis.11
Lemma 1. For   , local public investments are strategic complements i.e. @2vj(e)=@ej@e j  0 
while they are strategic substitutes i.e. @2vj(e)=@ej@e j  0 for   .12
 can also be interpreted as the elasticity of the marginal valuation for public good consumption. Thus,
10This type of utility function (2), with F (:) being an isoelastic function and G(:) being a CES function, has been used
by Ray et al. (2007) to analyze voluntary participation in a joint project with imperfect substitution between individual
e¤orts (but without spillover e¤ects). They focus on how (exogenous) share vectors a¤ect joint surplus. Note also that to
save on notations, we will work with the F (:) formulation throughout the text and the appendix.
11The proofs of the lemma and propositions are given in the appendix.
12See Bulow et al. (1985) for the denition of strategic complementarity or substitutability.
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decisions on local public investments are strategic complements (substitutes) if the inverse of the elasticity
of substitution or the degree of complementarity between local public goods given by  is greater
(lower) than the elasticity of the marginal valuation for public good consumption. In the special case
of  = , the cross-derivatives are zero, which means that the two regionsallocations are strategically
neutral. This corresponds to the setup considered by Besley and Coate (2003), where voterspreferences
are assumed to be separable in the levels of local public spending.
We now characterize the equilibrium outcome in the second stage of the game. We have:
Lemma 2. (i) Given the types j and  j of the two representatives, the non-cooperative game of
public good provision admits a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium, region js public good
provision (for j = A;B) is characterized by the following rst-order condition
jF
0 (Gj (e)) [Gj (e)]

e j  1, with equality for ej > 0. (4)
(ii) For  2 f[0; 1) [ (1;+1)g, there is a unique interior equilibrium with eA > 0 and eB > 0. For
 2 (1;+1), there is another corner equilibrium which involves eA = eB = 0.13
In other words, given the types of the two representatives (j ;  j), there is a unique equilibrium with
the property that local public investments are strictly positive in the two regions. In this equilibrium,
the system given by (4), with equality for j = A;B, implicitly yields the local public good levels under a
decentralized system as functions of the types of the two representatives, i.e. eA (A; B) and e

B (A; B).
If  2 (1;+1) there also exists a corner equilibrium, which we ignore. It is also worth pointing out that
the best-response functions of the regionsrepresentatives are equivalent to the (necessary and su¢ cient)
rst-order conditions and that with strategic substitutes (complements), best-response functions are de-
creasing (increasing). The prole of equilibrium response functions are depicted in Figure 1 for  2 [0; ),
and in Figure 2 for  2 (;+1).
INSERT FIGURES
We now turn to the election stage. Citizens, in each region, vote simultaneously to elect their rep-
resentatives. If the representatives of regions A and B are of types A and B , a type  citizen in
region j will have the following public good surplus wj(; j ;  j) = F [Gj (e (A; B))]   ej (j ;  j),
with e (A; B)  (eA (A; B) ; eB (A; B)). These preferences over types of representatives determine
13See the Appendix. Multiplicity is also possible for  = 0 and  ! +1. In the rst case, it happens when there are
also perfect spillovers i.e.  = 1 and when the two representatives have identical preferences  i.e. A = B : there is
a continuum of equilibria with the same public good surplus. The latter case corresponds to the weakest-linkpublic good
game: there is also a continuum of equilibria with varying public good surplus and in which the representativesdecisions
are matched each other.
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individualsvoting decisions. To characterize the outcome of the election stage, we rst establish the
following Lemma.
Lemma 3. Voterspreferences over types of representatives exhibit the single-crossing property: If 0 > 
and j > 
0
j , or if 
0 <  and j < 
0
j , then wj(; j ;  j)  wj(; 0j ;  j) ) wj(0; j ;  j) 
wj(
0; 0j ;  j).
14
As shown by Rothstein (1990, 1991) and Gans and Smart (1996), the single-crossing property guarantees
that a Condorcet winner exists and that it coincides with the preferred candidate of the voter with the
median preference given by mj .
We are interested in an equilibrium of the two-stage game, that is a majority preferred pair of local
representatives (A; 

B) such that e
 (A; 

B) solves the system given by Lemma 2 i.e. equation (4) with
equality for j = A;B. The equilibrium concept that rst comes to mind is that of a Subgame Perfect
Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in pure strategies. That is, the median type in region j prefers j to any
other type  2 ; , given the other regions representative type  j , and given the resulting subgame
of local public good provision. To prove the existence of such an equilibrium in this two-stage game
structure is very problematic. Indeed, while representativespayo¤s are concave in their own strategies,
the payo¤s of the decisive voters induced by the equilibrium of the public good provision subgame between
representatives are seemingly not (quasi-)concave. Nor is the induced game necessarily supermodular for
all the parameter values of the model.15
However, in the case of a decentralized system, quasi-concavity of each median voters payo¤ can be
easily established for  = 0 and  = . In the rst case, local public investments are perfect substitutes
while there are no strategic interactions in local public spending in the second case. Again, following
Besley and Coate (2003), these two specic cases have been extensively studied in the literature. One
can also show that median voterspayo¤ are quasi-concave in our setup for  2 [; 1). However, for
 2 f(0; ) [ (1;+1)g ; one need to use a weaker concept than that of a SPNE. We thus introduce the
concept of Local Nash Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (LNSPE) in pure strategies.
Let (again) mj be the taste parameter of the median voter in region j. Her payo¤ is thus given by
wj (mj ; j ;  j) = mjF [Gj (e (A; B))]   ej (j ;  j). We dene a LNSPE under decentralization as
follows:
Denition 1: Under decentralization, a vector    j ;  j is a Local Nash Subgame Perfect Equilib-
rium (LNSPE) if and only if (i) (@wj (mj ; j ;  j) =@j) () = 0, and
 
@2wj (mj ; j ;  j) =@2j

() < 0
for j = A;B; (ii) (ej (
) ; e j (
)) is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in the Stage-2 subgame 
and is characterized by (4) in Lemma 2 with equality for j = A;B.
14See Persson and Tabellini (2000, p. 23). The single-crossing property was formulated by Gans and Smart (1996), which
is essentially equivalent to the order restrictionof preferences rst formulated by Rothstein (1990, 1991).
15 I am very grateful to the reviewer for pointing out this di¢ culty.
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In words, each median voters equilibrium strategy ensures a local maximum of her payo¤ function, given
the equilibrium strategy of the other median voter and the resulting equilibrium policy outcome in stage
2. Hence, in a LNSPE, no median voter benets from a small unilateral deviation from her equilibrium
strategy. Of course, every LNSPE is a SPNE but the converse is not true. It might indeed be possible
that there is a representative type j lying outside the neighborhood of 

j which yields a higher payo¤
for region js median voter. In short, the LNSPE is a weaker concept than that of subgame perfection,
but is nevertheless characterized by the rst-order conditions.
As mentioned in the Introduction, this concept of "equilibrium" is closely related to that of a second-
order locally consistent equilibrium (2-LCE), as introduced by Gary-Bobo (1989) in the context of an
imperfectly general equilibrium model, or to the equivalent concept of a Local Nash Equilibrium (LNE)
used by Bonanno (1988) in a static oligopoly game.16 The justication is that rms have only local
knowledge of their demand curves (and therefore of their prot functions), so that they experiment
through small variations of their strategy variable and stop when they reach a local maximum. The
notion of LNE has also been exploited in models of tax competition (see, e.g., Bayindir-Upmann and
Ziad, 2005, or Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006) where the existence of (general) Nash equilibria (in pure
strategies) has proved di¢ cult to establish.17
For simplifying notations, let ej denote e

j (j ;  j). In a LNSPE, the representative type j for the
region js median voter, given the type of the other regions representative  j , must satisfy following
rst-order condition,
mjF
0 (Gj (e)) [Gj (e)]


e j
@ej
@j
+ e  j
@e j
@j

  @e

j
@j
= 0: (5)
Using (4), this expression can be rewritten as

mj
j
  1

@ej
@j
+ 
mj
j
 
e j
ej
! 
@e j
@j
= 0: (6)
Observe that j is larger (respectively lower) than mj if @e j=@j is positive (respectively negative).
Therefore, in general, median voters delegate policy to representatives with di¤erent preferences than
their own.
As mentioned above, we assume that the two median voters have identical preferences i.e. mA =
mB = m  and we focus on a symmetric equilibrium with median voters delegating policy to (two)
representatives of the same type, thus resulting in a symmetric equilibrium level of local public good
16Gary-Bobo (1989) develops the concept of a kth-order locally consistent equilibrium (k-LCE), which is an imperfectly
competitive equilibrium allocation at which rms perceive only a kth-order Taylor expansion of their true demand curves
(and therefore of their true prot functions). A 2-LCE is thus a strategy prole for which the rst derivative of each players
payo¤ function vanishes and the second derivative is negative.
17The idea of local Nash equilibrium is also exploited in probabilistic voting models (see, e.g., Duggan, 2000; Schoeld,
2004; and Patty; 2005).
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provision i.e. eA = e

B . We can then state the following Proposition.
18
Proposition 1: Let  =
p
5 2. If  = 0 or   , then there exists a unique symmetric LNSPE under
decentralization for any (; ) 2 (0; 1) [0; 1]. In this equilibrium, the election stage is characterized by:
(i) The median voter in each region with taste parameter m for public good consumption  delegates
policy to a representative with taste parameter
 =
(1 + ) [ (1  ) + ]
+ 
m: (7)
(ii) The median voter in each region delegates policy to a representative with a lower (respectively higher)
taste parameter for public good consumption than herself as  = 0 or  2 [; ] (respectively  2
f[; 1) [ (1;+1)g).
We can also establish the following corollary about the ine¢ ciency of a decentralized system.
Corollary 1: (i) The unique LNSPE under decentralization is always characterized by under-provision
of local public investments. (ii) The extent of under-provision is increasing in the spillover parameter 
and decreasing in the degree of complementarity between local public investments given by .
Proof: Let rst determine the optimal level of local public investment common to both regions. Recall
rst that, by assumption, mean and median voters have identical preferences within and across regions.
Therefore, the social optimum is given by the maximization of the sum of median voter utilities. With
the F (:) function being an isoelastic function  i.e. F (G) = G1   this optimal level is given by
maximizing

mG1    e, with G = (1+)1=(1 )e. This yields e^ = hm(1  )(1 + ) 1 1  i1=. Moreover,
under a decentralized system and using (4) in Lemma 2 the symmetric policy outcome is given by
e =
h
(1  )(1 + ) 1 
i1=
. The ratio of these two levels is thus given by e^=e = [m(1 + )=]
1
 .
Using (7), we then have
e^
e
=

+ 
 (1  ) + 
 1

; (8)
which is clearly greater than 1. Hence, the equilibrium of a decentralized system results in too low levels
of local public investments compared to the social optimum, even though median voters delegate policy
to representatives who put a higher weight on public good consumption than themselves. Furthermore,
18 In the proofs of Proposition 1 (for a decentralized system) and 2 (for a centralized system), we assume the existence
of a LNSPE and show that, if it the case, this equilibrium is unique and is characterized by the statements given in these
two propositions. The proofs of the existence of a LNSPE under decentralization (and under the su¢ cient condition that
  ) and under centralization are given in a separate appendix. In this second appendix, we also show that, in the case
of a decentralized system, there exists a SPNE for  = 0 and  2 [; 1). This additional appendix is available upon request.
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it is straightforward to verify that the term in [:] of equation (8) and thus the extent of under-provision
is increasing in , but decreasing in .19 
As shown by part (ii) of Proposition 1, delegating policy to a conservativerepresentative actually
arises when decisions are strategic substitutes, i.e., when    (provided that   ). This is because,
in that case, citizens in each region realize when electing their representatives that decreasing domestic
provision of public goods will induce the other regions representative to increase its investment. To put
it di¤erently, each median voter seeks to place the burden of total public good provision on the citizens of
the other region. However, these attempts are self-defeating and hence strategic delegation accentuates
the free-rider problem. And this is even more so the case as the spillover parameter as measured by 
rises (part (ii) of Corollary 1).
If, however, decisions on local public investments are strategic complements  i.e.     each
median voter delegates policy-making a liberalrepresentative, that is to someone who cares more for
public goods than she does because this will induce the other regions representative to also raise its own
public investment. These incentives are mutually reinforcing and hence the delegation process takes the
equilibrium closer to the optimum. And this is even more so the case as the degree of complementarity
between local public investments as measured by  rises (part (ii) of Corollary 1).
In the special case of  = , the utility of voters is separable in the levels of local public investments,
thus eliminating strategic interaction between regions. As a result, there are no incentives for strategic
delegation and each median voter prefers a candidate of her own type, i.e. j= = m. It follows
that the ine¢ ciency of decentralized decision-making is completely characterized by the inability of local
governments to internalize externalities. This corresponds to the case analyzed by Besley and Coate
(2003).
Furthermore, one can also observe that in the limiting case of perfect complementarity between local
public goods i.e.  ! +1 we have,
j!+1 = (1 + )m: (9)
Using e and e^ in the Proof of Corollary (1), we observe that e = e^, and so the decentralized system
yields the social optimum in that case.
If, however, there is perfect substitutability between local public goods i.e.  = 0 we obtain that
j=0 =
 
1  2m: (10)
Hence, the degree of conservativenessas measured by j  mj  is increasing in the square of the
parameter reecting the extent of public good externalities when local public investments are perfect
19Let  (; ) the term in [:] of (8). We have @ (; ) =@ = 2= [ (1  ) + ]2 > 0, and @ (; ) =@ =
 2= [ (1  ) + ]2  0.
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substitutes (see also the appendix of Dur and Roelfsema, 2005, and Buchholz et al., 2005). If, in addition,
we have perfect spilloversi.e.  = 1 then median voters delegate policy-making to representatives
who do not care to public good consumption at all in order to attempt to put the entire burden of public
good provision on the other region. Since the two median voters have the same incentives, no public
goods are supplied in equilibrium in this case.
4 Centralization
Under centralization, the policy outcome is also determined by a two-stage policy game. In the rst
stage, citizens in each region elect their representative in the central legislature. In the second stage,
the two representatives bargain over the levels of local public spending. Following Besley and Coate
(2003), we assume that the bargaining outcome is given by the maximum sum of the utilities of the two
representatives at the bargaining table.20
We also assume that, under a centralized regime, the level of public spending ej in the jth region
is funded by both a general lump-sum tax denoted  , and by a local tax denoted tj . The funding split
between local taxation and general taxation is exogenous and is parameterized by  2 [0; 1], representing
the share of general public funding. The head tax in region j is thus  j = +(1 )tj , where  = (ej+e j)2
and tj = ej . Hence, the head tax in region j can be rewritten as
 j =
(2  )ej + e j
2
; (11)
with  j +  j = ej + e j .
When  = 0, we have  j = ej and local public spending decided at the central level is nanced by
local taxation only. This setup corresponds to the situation analyzed by Buchholz et al. (2005) in which
elected governments cooperate over environmental policies so as to internalize a pollution externality
but without sharing the costs of greenerpolicies. If, however,  = 1, then  j = (ej + e j)=2 which
corresponds to a purecentralized system with the costs of public goods being shared through a common
budget, as it is assumed in Besley and Coate (2003).
Again, let the types of the elected representatives in region j and  j be j and  j , respectively.
They jointly maximize
vj(e) + v j(e) = jF (Gj (e)) +  jF (G j (e))  (ej + e j); (12)
20Besley and Coate (2003) rst analyze the case where decisions are taken by a minimum coalition of representatives in
fact by one representative in their two-region model. Then, they consider the utilitarian solution, which can be motivated
by the universalism view in the political science literature on distributive politics. According to this view, the elected
representatives develop a norm of reciprocity to overcome the problems associated with minimum coalitions (see, e.g.,
Weingast, 1979; and Shepsle and Weingast, 1981). Also, decisions in supranational bodies sometimes require unanimity,
thus forcing legislators to cooperate. This is the case in the EU for policies falling under the heading of the second pillar 
i.e. common foreign and security policy and third pillar  i.e. police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
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with respect to both ej and e j .
We have the following Lemma.
Lemma 4: Given the types j and  j of the two representatives, there is unique interior equilibrium
outcome under centralized decision-making, which is characterized by the following rst-order conditions,
jF
0 (Gj (e)) [Gj (e)]

e j +  jF
0 (G j (e)) [G j (e)]

e j = 1, for j = A;B: (13)
This system implicitly yields the local public good levels under a centralized system, as functions of the
types of the two representatives, i.e. ~eA (A; B) and ~eB (A; B).
We now turn to the election stage. If the representatives in regions A and B are of types A
and B , a type  citizen in region j will have the following public good surplus: wj (; j ;  j) =
F [Gj (~e (A; B))]  [(2  )~ej (A; B) + ~e j (A; B)] =2, with ~e (A; B) (~eA (A; B) ; ~eB (A; B)).
Citizenspreferences over types still satisfy the single-crossing property, which is su¢ cient to apply the
median voter result21 : the representative that is majority-preferred to any other representative is the one
that is most preferred by the voter with the median preference mj in region j.
We are still interested in an equilibrium of this two-stage game, that is a majority preferred pair
(~A; ~B) such that ~e (~A; ~B) solves the system given by Lemma 4. Under centralization, the proof of the
existence of a SPNE in pure strategies is even more problematic than under decentralization, except for
 = 0 and  = . Therefore, we continue to use the weaker concept of a Local Nash Subgame Perfect
Equilibrium (LNSPE).
The payo¤of the median voter in region j under centralization is wj (mj ; j ;  j) = mjF [Gj (~e (A; B))] 
[(2  )~ej (A; B) + ~e j (A; B)] =2. In a manner similar to the case of decentralization, we thus dene
a LNSPE under centralization as follows:
Denition 2: Under centralization, a vector ~  (~j ; ~ j) is a Local Nash Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
(LNSPE) if and only if (i) (@wj (mj ; j ;  j) =@j) (~) = 0, and
 
@2wj (mj ; j ;  j) =@2j

(~) < 0 for
j = A;B; (ii) (~ej(~); ~e j(~)) maximizes the joint public good surplus of the two representatives in the
Stage-2 subgame and is characterized by (13) in Lemma 4 for j = A;B.
Again, each median voters equilibrium strategy ensures a local maximum of her payo¤ function, given
the equilibrium strategy of the other median voter and the resulting equilibrium policy outcome in stage
2.
21The Proof is the same as in Lemma 3. Equilibrium public good levels under centralization are implicitly dened by
(13) for j = A;B. Applying the implicit function theorem together with the fact that aggregate payo¤ given by (12) is
strictly concave in ej (see the Proof of Lemma 4), we have that ej and Gj(e) are both increasing in j . It follows that the
single-crossing property is satised (see the Proof of Lemma 3).
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For simplifying notations, let ~ej denote ~ej (j ;  j). In a LNSPE, the representative type j for the
region js median voter, given the type of the other regions representative  j , must satisfy the following
rst-order condition,
mjF
0 (Gj (~e)) [Gj (~e)]


~e j
@~ej
@j
+ ~e  j
@~e j
@j

  12

(2  )@~ej
@j
+ 
@~e j
@j

= 0: (14)
The two median voters have identical preferences, i.e. mA = mB = m. We thus focus on a symmetric
equilibrium with median voters delegating policy to (two) representatives of the same type, thus resulting
in a symmetric equilibrium level of local public good provision i.e. ~eA = ~eB . We then have the following
Proposition.22
Proposition 2: If   0:5, then there exists a unique symmetric LNSPE under centralization for any
(; ) 2 [0; 1]2 and any  2 f[0; 1) [ (1;+1)g. In this equilibrium, the election stage is characterized by:
(i) The median voter in each region with taste parameter m for public good consumption  delegates
policy to a representative with taste parameter
~ =
2
h
2 +  (1  )2
i
4 +  (1  ) [2  (1 + )]m: (15)
(ii) Let ~  2= (1 + ). Then, the median voter in each region delegates policy to a representative with
a higher (respectively lower) taste parameter for public good consumption than herself, thus resulting in
over-provision (respectively under-provision) of local public investments as   ~ (respectively   ~).
Again, median voters delegate policy to representatives with di¤erent preferences than their own. How-
ever, as shown by part (ii) of this Proposition, and in contrast to the decentralized system, whether
they choose a conservativerepresentative (i.e. ~  m) or a liberalrepresentative (i.e. ~  m) does
not depend on the degree of complementarity between local public investments (given by ) relative to
the elasticity of the marginal valuation for public good consumption (given by ). It depends only on
the funding split between local taxation and general taxation parameterized by  relative to the size of
public good spillovers given by . More precisely, the larger the share of general funding and the lower
the spillovers are, the more likely median voters delegate policy to representatives who put a higher weigh
on public good consumption than themselves. Hence, in the extreme case of pork-barrel spending i.e.
 = 1 the strategic choice of a liberalrepresentative is a commitment device to extract more of the
common scal resources in the second stage of the game. Conversely, if local public investments generate
large spillover e¤ects and are (mainly) nanced by local taxation, then the choice of a conservative
representative is a way to shift the burden of public good provision to the other region. Obviously, in
22Again, in the proof of this Proposition, we assume the existence of a LNSPE. The proof of the existence of a LNSPE
(under the su¢ cient condition that   0:5) is given in a separate appendix. In this second appendix, we also state than
under a centralized system, there exists a SPNE  = 0 and  = . This additional appendix is available upon request.
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either case, these attempts are self-defeating and the equilibrium results in either over-provision or under-
provision of local public goods compared to the social optimum that would be obtained in the absence
of delegation. (Recall that the two representatives fully cooperate in the central legislature).
The following Corollary makes further statements about the (potential) distortion induced by the
delegation process.
Corollary 2: (i) The "optimal cost-sharing rule" resulting in a LNSPE with sincere delegation  i.e.
~ = m  is such that ~ = 2= (1 + ), which is increasing in . (ii) For   ~ (respectively   ~), ~ is
decreasing (respectively increasing), and hence the extent of over-provision (respectively under-provision)
is decreasing in the degree of complementarity given by . However, the sign of the derivative of ~ with
respect to  is indeterminate.23
The share of general funding given by  can be interpreted as a budgetary externality. Part (i) of
Corollary 2 intuitively shows that larger public good spillovers must be compensated by a larger budgetary
externality to induce sincere delegation and hence an e¢ cient policy outcome under a centralized system.
Local nancing ( = 0) is only optimal in case of pure local public goods ( = 0), while complete cost
sharing ( = 1) is only optimal in case of global public goods ( = 1). In general, when the extent
of the budgetary externality  is di¤erent from "the optimal cost-sharing rule" given by ~, centralized
decision-making is ine¢ cient as is the case of decentralized decision-making. The di¤erence is that the
provision of local public goods can be too low, but also too high compared to the social optimum.
These results are reminiscent to those obtained by Dur and Roelfsema (2005). Again, these authors
extend Besley and Coate (2003)s analysis by considering that some costs cannot be shared among regions
and in turn derive the "optimal nancing rule" that eliminates the incentives for strategic delegation under
a centralized (or cooperative) regime. Essentially, they also show that larger public good externalities
must be compensated by a greater sharing of the costs of local public spending.24 However, as usual
in the literature, they model public good surplus either as a (weighted) sum of functions implying no
strategic interactions in local public investments or as a function of the (weighted) sum of local public
investments implying perfect substitutability between these investments.
The novelty here is that the degree of complementarity between local public investments also a¤ects
23The sign of @~=@ is the same as the sign of its numerator, which is given by: 4 (1  ) [2   (1 + )]m. This term
is negative (respectively positive) for  larger (respectively lower) than ~ = 2= (1 + ). The sign of @~=@ is the same as
the sign of its numerator, which is given by:  4 (1  )(1  2) + + 2 [(1  )   (2  )]m. This term can be
positive or negative depending on the exact values of the triplet (; ; ).
24 In Dur and Roelfsema (2005), the nancing rule of a centralized system is summarized by three parameters: the weight
of direct tax costs shared among regions through a common budget; the weight of an indirect utility cost; and the weight
of the cross-subsidy from one region to the other. They show that the "optimal" cross-subsidy is increasing in the spillover
parameter, which amounts to increase the budgetary externality. Since a linear cost-division rule is imposed, we believe
that it is more transparent and clear to describe the nancing rule of a centralized system by a unique parameter, as in the
present framework.
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the extent of the distortion induced by strategic delegation under centralized decision-making (as under
decentralized decision-making). Indeed, from point (ii) of Corollary 2, we have that a larger degree of
complementarity between local public investments  i.e. a higher  decreases the distortion induced
by the delegation process in that it decreases the extent of over-provision for   ~, or the extent of
under-provision for   ~. In the limit case of weakest-linkpublic goods  i.e.  ! +1 we have
~j!+1 = m, and so a centralized system yields the social optimum as does a decentralized system in
this case. This is also the case if there are perfectpublic good spillovers  i.e.  = 1  since then
~j=1 = m independently of the degree of complementarity between local public goods (provided  > 0).
Under a decentralized system, however, the case of perfect spilloversexacerbates the under-provision of
public goods (see Corollary 1).
In case of perfect substitutability between local public goods i.e.  = 0 we obtain that
~j=0 =
2 (1  )
2   (1 + )m: (16)
If furthermore public investments are entirely nanced by local taxation i.e.  = 0 then appointed
representatives are even more conservative than under a decentralized system since then ~j==0 =
(1  )m  j=0 =
 
1  2m.25 In the other extreme of complete cost sharing ( = 1) and perfect
substitutability between local public goods ( = 0), we have delegation to an extreme liberalrepresen-
tative, that is ~j=0;=1 = 2m independently of the size of spillovers given by .
5 Centralization versus Decentralization
We now investigate which system dominates the other from a social welfare point of view. Recall that by
assumption, in each region, there is a continuum of citizens of mass one and that the median voter has
the same preferences than the mean voter. Hence, the payo¤ of each regions median voter also represents
the social welfare of her region.
The general expressions of the levels of welfare as well as the levels of local public investments under the
two systems are given in the appendix. In order to simplify the analysis, we now assume that the elasticity
of the marginal valuation for public good consumption is such that  = 0:5, i.e. F [Gj (e)] =
p
Gj (e).26
In this case, we have the following levels of welfare,
25This result is related to that obtained by Buchholz et al. (2005) who show that voters support candidates who are
even less green than they are to represent them in the cooperative scenario compared to the isolationist scenario. They
also show that in the extreme case of global pollution, elected politicians pay no attention at all to the environment in any
scenario. This would correspond to  = 1 and  = 0 in our setup, with no provision of public goods in equilibrium (as
under decentralization in this case; see equation (10)).
26This is consistent with the su¢ cient condition imposed for the existence of a LNSPE under centralization (see Propo-
sition 2 and the separate appendix). The condition for the existence of a LNSPE is that    = p5  2, which is assumed
to hold in this section.
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 =
h
(1 + 2)
2   2
i
(1 + )
1
1 
4 [1 + 2]
2 m
2; (17)
under a decentralized system, and
~ =

4 + (1  )2 4 + (1  2)(1  ) (1 + ) 11 
[8 + (1  ) [2  (1 + )]]2 m
2; (18)
in a centralized system.
The following Proposition considers two extreme nancing rules under a centralized system: (i) local
public spending is entirely nanced by local taxation (but yet decided at the centralized level), i.e.  = 0;
(ii) local public spending is entirely nanced by general taxation, i.e.  = 1.
Proposition 3: Suppose that F [Gj (e)] =
p
Gj (e), then we have:
(i) When local public investments are nanced by local taxation only  i.e.  = 0  then centralization
always dominates decentralization.
(ii) When local public investments are nanced by general taxation only i.e.  = 1 then centralization
dominates decentralization if   3 2p2 and   ~ with ~  (1  )3 = 2  6   2   1. Otherwise,
decentralization dominates centralization.
Again, there is always under-provision under a decentralized system whether local public good decisions
are strategic substitutes or complements (Corollary 1). From Proposition 2, this is also the case under a
centralized system when local public spending is nanced by local taxation only i.e.  = 0 since in that
case   ~. Actually, it is possible (but not necessary) that, under a centralized system, median voters
appoint representatives who are even more conservative than under a decentralized system (which arises,
for example, when  = 0). However, in this case and according to the rst part (i) of Proposition 3, the
benets from cooperation between representatives under a centralized system in terms of internalizing
public good externalities  are larger than the increased cost of the distortion induced by strategic
delegation. In any case, the extent of under-provision is lower under a centralized system and thus this
system improves welfare relative to decentralization independently of the size of the public good spillovers
and of the degree of complementarity between local public goods.
Now let consider the most commonly used assumption of a common nancing rule  i.e.  = 1
 adopted by Besley and Coate (2003), among others.27 In this case, a centralized system does not
necessarily dominate a decentralized system as shown by the second part (ii) of Proposition 3. Indeed,
for  = 1, there is over-provision of public goods under centralization (while decentralization is still
characterized by under-provision). Thus, centralization is welfare improving if and only if the size of
27The prevalence of this assumption in the literature is justied to some extent since most centralized systems of gov-
ernment operate (roughly) according to such a rule. Indeed, equal cost sharing is very often a constitutionally imposed
arrangement. For example, in most European countries, uniform tax rules are at the core of budgeting institutions (see,
e.g., Von Hagen, 1992).
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spillovers and the degree of complementarity between the two local public goods are both relatively
large. Note, however, that ~ is a decreasing function of the spillover parameter. Therefore, providing
 is larger than 3   2p2, an increase in its value alleviates the constraint on the minimum degree of
complementarity that is required for centralization to be desirable.28
Yet, if local public investments are perfectsubstitutes i.e.  = 0 then decentralization is most
preferred by the median voters irrespective of the size of spillovers. This result contrasts strongly with
previous political economy studies on the trade-o¤ between centralized and decentralized provision of
local public goods. Indeed, following OatesDecentralization Theorem, the drawback with a decentralized
system is typically reected by the inability of local governments to internalize public good externalities,
while the ine¢ ciency of a centralized system stems from political economy considerations. Therefore, in
general, there is a threshold level of externalities above which the benets of improved coordination are
larger than the costs of the political ine¢ ciencies of centralization.
In fact, Besley and Coate (2003), Dur and Roelfsema (2005) and a number of other scholars, assume
that voters preferences are separable in the levels of public spending in di¤erent regions. It follows
that under a decentralized system, there are no strategic interactions across regions: the level of public
investment decided by one representative has no e¤ect on that chosen by the representative of the other
region.29 In other words, the outcome of a decentralized system is an equilibrium in dominant strategies
and equilibrium best-response curves are two straight lines with 0 slope. It has the important implication
that there are no incentives for strategic delegation under decentralization, so that the drawback of
decentralization is completely characterized by the free-rider problem in public good provision.
In the present analysis, strategic delegation occurs under both centralization and decentralization as
a consequence of the existence of strategic interactions in the public good game. This is the case even
though local public investments are assumed to be perfectsubstitutes, i.e.  = 0, so that the public
good surplus in each region is a concave function of the (weighted) sum of local public goods. As already
explained, this implies that median voters appoint conservativerepresentatives. In turn, this accentuates
the classic free-rider problem and the under-provision of public goods, thus making decentralization even
more ine¢ cient than in Besley and Coate (2003).
At rst sight, this might seem surprising because when  = 0 (and  = 1), Proposition 3 implies that
decentralization dominates centralization even though local public investments correspond very closely
28We can also compare the threshold value ~ to the su¢ cient condition used for proving the existence of a LNSPE
under a decentralized system (see Proposition 1). In fact, for  = 0:5, the condition in question is given by    =
(1=4)
hp
33  5
i
' 0:19 (see the separate appendix). Numerically, we have that ~   for any  & 0:42, in which case
centralization dominates decentralization under the su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition for the existence of a LNSPE
in a decentralized system.
29For example, the utility from public goods in Besley and Coate (2003) is given by (with our notations):
 [(1  ) ln(ej) +  ln(e j)]. The cross-derivatives with respect to ej and e j are equal to 0, which means that there
are no strategic interactions. Again, this corresponds to the special case of  =  in our framework.
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to the provision of a pure global public good, i.e.  approaches 1.30 But, the ine¢ ciency of centralized
decision-making is even stronger in our framework with  = 0 (and  = 1). Under centralization, the
separability assumption of Besley and Coate (2003) implies that electing a representative with a higher
taste for public goods increases domestic spending but also increases to a lesser extent foreign public
spending. In the present analysis with  = 0, appointing a liberalagent increases domestic spending but
reduces foreign spending regardless of .31 Consequently, each median voter has stronger incentives to
elect a liberalrepresentative, which accentuates the over-provision of public goods and the ine¢ ciency
of centralized decision-making compared to Besley and Coate (2003). Furthermore, we have seen that
with complete cost sharing i.e.  = 1 each median voter appoints an extreme liberalrepresentative,
that is a type 2m representative independently of the size of the spillover e¤ects (i.e., ~j=0;=1 = 2m).
This can explain why centralization never dominates decentralization in the perfect-substitutescase.
To summarize, the trade-o¤ between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods as
a function of spillovers identied by Besley and Coate (2003)  and others  hinges critically on the
separability assumption of local public goods in the utility of voters (which again implies no strategic
interactions across regions). Without this assumption, there is no trade-o¤ between the two systems and
decentralization always dominate centralization when local public investments are perfectsubstitutes
(i.e.  = 0) and are funded from a common budget (i.e.  = 1). Dur and Roelfsema (2005) also use
the separability assumption in the main body of their analysis and extend in an additional appendix 
their model to the case of a concave function of the weighted sum of local public goods. They properly
refer to this case as that of strategic substitutes and show that median voters appoint conservative
representatives under decentralization. However, they do not investigate the relative welfare performance
of the two systems with this extension. Presumably, this is because there is no trade-o¤ in this case as it
is shown here.
As mentioned in the Introduction, there is a number of empirical studies showing that there exist
strategic interactions in public spending between neighboring jurisdictions and, moreover, these studies
conclude (in general) to the presence of a strategic complementarity. That being said, the present analysis
applies to both strategic complementarity and substitutability in public spending.32 Simply, with a
common nancing rule, local public investments must not be perfectsubstitutes for centralization to
possibly dominate decentralization. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the welfare di¤erence between
the two systems with or without common nancing of local public goods given by (A46) and (A47)
in the appendix  is non-monotonic in  for any  2 [0; 1] and non-monotonic in  as well for any
30When  = 0 and  = 1, the equilibrium under centralization is not dened if we further assume  = 1, as it can be
seen from (16). Under decentralization, no public goods are supplied in equilibrium in this case, as shown by (10).
31With  = 0, we indeed have that @~eB=@A and @~eA=@A are of opposite signs. This can be seen from equation (A37)
in the Appendix.
32Notice also that   ~ and   3  2p2 does not necessarily imply that local public investments must be strategic
complements since these two conditions can be satised for    = 0:5.
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 2 (1;+1).33 In other words, an increase in spillovers or in the degree of complementarity between
local public investments does not necessarily make centralization relatively more attractive, whether it is
welfare-superior to decentralization or not.
6 Conclusion
This paper revisits the traditional analysis of the political economy of (de)centralization by assuming a
generalized CES function for aggregating local public investments with spillover e¤ects. Depending on
the degree of complementarity between local public goods, median voters strategically delegate policy
to either conservativeor to liberal representatives under decentralized decision-making. In the rst
case, it accentuates the free-rider problem in public good provision, while it mitigates it in the second
case. Under centralized decision-making, the process of strategic delegation results in either too low or
too much public spending, with the outcome crucially depending on the sharing of the costs of local
public spending relative to the size of the spillover e¤ects. Finally, we show that, with a common budget
nancing rule, large public good externalities are not su¢ cient for a centralized system to dominate a
decentralized system from the median voterspoint of view. Indeed, it also requires a minimum degree
of complementarity between local public investments.
In this study, we tried to generalize previous political economy studies of the trade-o¤between central-
ized and decentralized provision of local public goods with spillover e¤ects. However, our formal analysis
can be criticized on several fronts. First, we assumed that voterspreferences are quasi-linear in private
consumption. This is a very common assumption in the political economy literature partly because it
serves to guarantee the existence of a Condorcet winner. Yet, this modeling assumption implies that
there are no income e¤ects on public good provision, which may not be an appropriate assumption for
all types of (local) public goods. Second, we assumed perfectly identical regions, which greatly simplies
the analysis in that it allows focusing on symmetric equilibria only. But, even in this case, a centralized
system need not be more e¢ cient than a decentralized system. We conjecture that it should be also the
case in presence of some source of asymmetry across regions, although the equilibrium levels of public
spending under both a decentralized and a centralized system would be di¤erent across regions. It
must be remembered also that if regions were heterogeneous, we would lose the symmetry of the model
and thus would no be able to obtain closed form solutions.
Finally, we have used the concept of a Local Nash Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (LNSPE) for dealing
with the problem of equilibrium existence in the model of decentralized system and that of a centralized
system. In such an equilibrium, no median voter faces an incentive to deviate unilaterally from her
equilibrium strategy by choosing a slightly di¤erent type of representative. If a (symmetric) Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) exists in each of the two systems, then it must coincides with the
33 Indeed, numerical simulations shows that the only exception is for  < 1, with the welfare di¤erence being increasing
in :
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corresponding LNSPE. Yet, it does not imply that a SPNE actually exists. The problem of existence of
such an equilibrium in a two-stage political-economy model of public good provision such as ours remains
an open question that is left for future research.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The rst derivative of vj (e) given by (3) with respect to ej is given by
@vj (e)
@ej
= jF
0 (Gj (e))
@Gj (e)
@ej
  1: (A1)
From (1), we have that @Gj (e) =@ej = [Gj (e)]

e j , and hence
@vj (e)
@ej
= jF
0 (Gj (e)) [Gj (e)]

e j   1: (A2)
Now, calculating the derivative of (A2) with respect to e j , we have
@2vj (e)
@ej@e j
= je
 
j

F 00 (Gj (e))
@Gj (e)
@e j
[Gj (e)]

+ F 0 (Gj (e)) [Gj (e)]
 1 @Gj (e)
@e j

; (A3)
which can be rewritten as
@2vj (e)
@ej@e j
= je
 
j
@Gj (e)
@e j
[Gj (e)]
 1 fF 00 (Gj (e))Gj (e) + F 0 (Gj (e))g : (A4)
Now, let    [F 00 (Gj (e)) :Gj (e)]=F 0 (Gj (e)) be the elasticity of the marginal utility for public good
consumption and factorizing by F 0 (Gj), we obtain
@2vj (e)
@ej@e j
= je
 
j
@Gj (e)
@e j
[Gj (e)]
 1
F 0 (Gj (e)) [   ] ; (A5)
We also have @Gj (e) =@e j =  [Gj (e)]

e  j . Hence, (A5) can be rewritten as
@2vj (e)
@ej@e j
= je
 
j e
 
 j [Gj (e)]
2 1
F 0 (Gj (e)) [   ] ; (A6)
Therefore, @2vj(e)=@ej@e j is positive (respectively negative) and local public investments are strategic
complements (respectively substitutes) for  larger (respectively lower) than .
7.2 Proof of Lemma 2
(i) Existence: We rst show that the game of public good provision admits a pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium. First, each regions representative can at most invest its private endowment, y, in the public good
so that the strategy space of each representative is a compact interval, S = [0; y]. We now show that
the maximization problem of each representative is strictly concave. Using (A1), the second derivative
of vj(e) with respect to ej is given by
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@2vj (e)
@e2j
= j
(
F 00 (Gj (e))

@Gj (e)
@ej
2
+ F 0 (Gj (e))
@2Gj (e)
@e2j
)
: (A7)
The rst term in f:g is negative since F 00 (:) < 0. The sign of the second term is the same as the sign of
@2Gj (e) =@e
2
j since F
0 (:) > 0. We have @Gj (e) =@ej = [Gj (e)]

e j and hence
@2Gj (e)
@e2j
=  [Gj (e)]
 1 @Gj (e)
@ej
e j    [Gj (e)] e  1j : (A8)
Again, @Gj (e) =@ej = [Gj (e)]

e j , so that (A8) can be rewritten as follows
@2Gj (e)
@e2j
=  [Gj (e)]
2 1
e 2j
h
1  [Gj (e)]1  e (1 )j
i
: (A9)
This (second) derivative is strictly negative since [Gj (e)]
1 
e
 (1 )
j = 1 + (e j=ej)
1  > 1. It fol-
lows that @2vj (e) =@e2j given by (A7) is strictly negative. Specically (and for future use), substituting
@2Gj (e) =@e
2
j =   [Gj (e)]2 1 e 2j (e j=ej)1  into (A7) yields
@2vj (e)
@e2j
= j
n
F 00 (Gj (e)) [Gj (e)]
2
e 2j   F 0 (Gj (e)) [Gj (e)]2 1 e 2j (e j=ej)1 
o
: (A10)
Factorizing by F 0 (Gj (e)) [Gj (e)]
2 1
e 2j and using  =  [F
00
(Gj (e)) :Gj (e)]=F
0 (Gj (e)), (A10) can
be rewritten as
@2vj (e)
@e2j
=  jF 0 (Gj (e)) [Gj (e)]2 1 e 2j

+ (e j=ej)1 

< 0. (A11)
As a result vj (e) is strictly concave and continuous in ej for  2 [0; 1) or  2 (1;+1), which guarantees
the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the rst-order condition given by (4)
is both necessary and su¢ cient for characterizing the best-response function of region js representative.
(ii) Uniqueness: We rst observe that there does not exist an equilibrium in which for one region a
corner solution at zero public investments is obtained while an interior solution holds for the other region
for any  2 f[0; 1) [ (1;+1)g. First, for  2 [0; 1), the rst-order condition (4) cannot be satised for
ej = 0 and e j > 0 because in that case Gj (e) > 0 and the left-hand term of (4) approaches innity.
Second, if  2 (1;+1) and ej = 0 then, as mentioned in the text, we take the limit of (1), i.e. Gj (e) = 0
and G j (e) = 0. Hence, v j (e) is strictly decreasing in e j , and so ej = 0 and e j = 0 are mutually
best responses.
Next, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium with ej > 0, for j = A;B, when local pub-
lic investments are strategic substitutes  i.e.  2 [0; ) and when they are strategic complements
 i.e.  2 (;+1). For  2 [0; ), the proof proceeds by contradiction (in the spirit of Bloch
and Zenginobuz, 2007). Suppose that there exists two distinct equilibria e  (ej ; e j) 2 <2+ and
e0  e0j ; e0 j 2 <2+ . Suppose further, without loss of generality, that e0j < ej . We rst show that
this implies Gj (e0) > Gj (e). From the rst-order condition (4), we have jF 0 (Gj (e)) [Gj (e)]

=
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ej . The right-hand term (RHT) is lower with e
0
j than with ej , which implies that the left-hand
term (LHT) must also be lower with e0j . The derivative of this term with respect to Gj (e) is given
by @ (LHT ) =@Gj (e) = jF 00 (Gj (e)) [Gj (e)]

+ jF
0 (Gj (e)) [Gj (e)]
 1. This can be rewritten as
@ (LHT ) =@Gj (e) = j [Gj (e)]
 1
F 0 (Gj (e)) [   ], which is negative for  <  (so that the LHT
is decreasing in Gj (e)). Hence, we must have Gj (e0) > Gj (e) for satisfying the rst-order condition
in region j when e0j < ej . However, Gj (e
0) > Gj (e) and e0j < ej necessarily imply e
0
 j > e j and
G j (e0) > G j (e). But for region  j, the RHT of the rst-order condition is (also) increasing in e j
and the LHT is (also) decreasing G j (e). Therefore, one cannot have another equilibrium e0 6= e, which
satises the two rst-order conditions. To summarize, there is a unique equilibrium which involves eA > 0
and eB > 0 for  2 [0; ).
Suppose now that  2 (;+1). In an interior equilibrium, public good provision is still characterized
by the rst-order condition (4) with equality. This equation implicitly denes ej = ' (j ; e j). By the im-
plicit function theorem, '(:) is continuous and furthermore @ej=@e j =  

@2vj (e) =@ej@e j

=[@2vj (e) =@e
2
j ],
with @2vj (e) =@e2j being strictly negative (from Lemma 2). Using (A6) and (A11), we have
@ej
@e j
=
 (   )
 [e j=ej ]

+  [e j=ej ]
; (A12)
which is positive for  >  (and negative for  < ). When  > , one can also observe that
@2ej=@e
2
 j < 0, so that best-response functions are increasing at a decreasing rate. We also have that
(@ej=@e j)je j!0 = +1, which means that near the origin, each best-response function must be on
the upper side of the 45 line. At the other extreme, we have (@ej=@e j)je j!+1 = 0, so that each
best-response function must cross the 45 line. Since its slope is always decreasing, each best-response
function cross the 45 line only once. There is thus a unique equilibrium which involves eA > 0 and
eB > 0 for  2 (;+1).
For  =   which corresponds to the analysis of Besley and Coate (2003)  there is a unique
equilibrium in dominant strategies, and best-response functions are two straight lines with 0 slope.
7.3 Proof of Lemma 3
We rst show that ej and Gj (e) are increasing in j . Equilibrium public good provision is charac-
terized by the rst-order condition (4). Again, this equation implicitly denes ej = ' (j ; e j). By
the implicit function theorem, @ej=@j =  

@2vj (e) =@ej@j

=[@2vj (e) =@e
2
j ]. Using (A2), we have
@2vj (e) =@ej@j = F
0 (Gj (e)) [Gj (e)]

e j > 0. Again, we also have @
2vj (e) =@e
2
j < 0 (Lemma 2). It
follows that @ej=@j > 0. This also implies that @Gj (e) =@j > 0 since Gj (e) is increasing in ej .
Next suppose that 0 >  and j > 
0
j . The inequality wj(; j ;  j)  wj(; 0j ;  j) can be rewritten
as 

F (Gj (j ;  j))  F (Gj(0j ;  j))
  ej (j ;  j)   ej(0j ;  j). The right-hand term and the term
in [:] in the left-hand side are both strictly positive (since F (:) is also an increasing function). So, if
this inequality is veried for a type  citizen in region j, it is also obviously veried for a type 0 citizen
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with 0 > , i.e., wj(0; j ;  j)  wj(0; 0j ;  j). Suppose now that 0 <  and j < 
0
j . The inequality
wj(; j ;  j)  wj(; 0j ;  j) can be rewritten as 

F (Gj(
0
j ;  j))  F (Gj (j ;  j))
  ej(0j ;  j)  
ej(j ;  j). Again, the right-hand term and the term in [:] in the left-hand side are both strictly positive.
So if this inequality is veried for a type  citizen in region j, it is also obviously veried for a type 0
citizen with 0 < , i.e., wj(0; j ;  j)  wj(0; 0j ;  j).
7.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Here, we just assume the existence of a LNSPE (under the su¢ cient condition that   ) and characterize
the properties of this equilibrium. We also show that if a symmetric LNSPE exists, then this equilibrium
is unique. The proof of the existence of such an equilibrium under decentralization is given in a separate
appendix. In this second appendix, we also show that, in the case of a decentralized system, there exists
a SPNE for  = 0 and  2 [; 1). This additional appendix is available upon request.
(i) in a LNSPE, the preferred representative of region js median voter is given by the rst-order
condition (6). We rst derive the expression for @e j=@j . For expositional convenience only let j  A
and  j  B, so that we rst determine @e B=@A. Using (4), eB must satisfy
BF
0 (GB (e)) [GB (e)]

e B   1 = 0: (A13)
Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to A yields
 Be  1B F 0 (GB (e)) [GB (e)]
@eB
@A
+Be
 
B  [GB (e
)] 1 F 0 (GB (e))
@GB (e
)
@A
+Be
 
B [GB (e
)] F
00
(GB (e
))
@GB (e
)
@A
= 0: (A14)
Factorizing by Be
  1
B [GB (e
)] 1, the equality (A14) reduces to
 F 0 (GB (e)) [GB (e)] @e

B
@A
+eBF
0 (GB (e))
@GB (e
)
@A
+eB [GB (e
)]F
00
(GB (e
))
@GB (e
)
@A
= 0 (A15)
Now, factorizing by F 0 (GB (e)) and use  =  [F 00 (Gj (e)) :Gj (e)]=F 0 (Gj (e)), then the equality (A15)
reduces to
  [GB (e)] @e

B
@A
+ eB
@GB (e
)
@A
  eB
@GB (e
)
@A
= 0: (A16)
We also have GB (e) =

e1 B + e
1 
A
 1
1  and hence
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@GB (e
)
@A
= [GB (e
)]

e B
@eB
@A
+ e A
@eA
@A

: (A17)
Substituting this expression into (A16), we have
  [GB (e)] @e

B
@A
+ eB [GB (e
)]

e B
@eB
@A
+ e A
@eA
@A

(   ) = 0: (A18)
Factorizing by [GB (e)]
 and observing that [GB (e)]
1 
=

e1 B + e
1 
A

, the equality (A18) re-
duces to
   e1 B + e1 A  @eB@A + eB

e B
@eB
@A
+ e A
@eA
@A

(   ) = 0: (A19)
This implies
@eB
@A
=

 (   ) eBe A
e1 B + e
1 
A

@eA
@A
: (A20)
Now, assuming that the median voters in both regions have the same taste parameter m, this implies
that A = B =  and eA = e

B = e
. In a symmetric equilibrium, (A20) then reduces to
@eB
@A

eB=e

A
=
 (   )
+ 
@eA
@A

eA=e

B
: (A21)
Substituting into the rst-order condition (6) then yields
m

  1

+
m

(   )
+ 
= 0: (A22)
The solution of this equation is thus given by (7) in Proposition 1.
(ii) We have  T m, if (1 + ) [ (1  ) + ] T + , which reduces to 2(   ) T 0 or  T .
7.5 Proof of Lemma 4
We show that aggregated payo¤ given by (12) is strictly concave, so that a unique solutions results.
From Lemma 2 equation (A11) we have that @2vj (e) =@e2j < 0. It is then su¢ cient to show that
@2v j (e) =@e2j < 0. We have
@v j (e)
@ej
=  jF 0 (G j (e))
@G j (e)
@ej
  1: (A23)
Now, calculating the second derivative of v j(e) with respect to ej , we obtain
@2v j (e)
@e2j
=  j
(
F 00 (G j (e))

@G j (e)
@ej
2
+ F 0 (G j (e))
@2G j (e)
@e2j
)
: (A24)
The rst term in f:g is negative since F 00 (:) < 0. The sign of the second term in f:g is the same as the
sign of @2G j (e) =@e2j since F
0 (:) > 0. We have @G j (e) =@ej =  [G j (e)]

e j , and hence
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@2G j (e)
@e2j
= 

 [G j (e)]
 1 @G j (e)
@ej
e j    [G j (e)] e  1j

: (A25)
Again, @G j (e) =@ej =  [G j (e)]

e j so that (A25) can be rewritten as follows
@2G j (e)
@e2j
=  [G j (e)]
2 1
e 2j
h
   [G j (e)]1  e (1 )j
i
; (A26)
which is strictly negative since [G j (e)]
1 
e
 (1 )
j = +(e j=ej)
1  > . It follows that @2v j (e) =@e2j <
0. Together with Lemma 2, we have that vj (e) + v j (e) is strictly concave in ej . There is thus a unique
solution which is given by the (necessary and su¢ cient) rst-order condition (13).
7.6 Proof of Proposition 2
Again for this proof, we just assume the existence of a LNSPE (under the su¢ cient condition that   0:5)
and characterize the properties of this equilibrium. The proof of existence of such an equilibrium under
centralization is given in a separate appendix, which is available upon request.
In a LNSPE, the preferred representative of region js median voter is given by the rst-order condition
(14). We then need to derive the expression of @~e j=@j . Again, for expositional convenience only, we
derive the outcome of the delegation stage for region A keeping in mind that the same reasoning will
apply for region B. Hence, we rst characterize @~eB=@A.
Using (13), ~eA and ~eB are such that
AF
0 (GA (~e)) [GA (~e)]

+ BF
0 (GB (~e)) [GB (~e)]

~eA
=
BF
0 (GB (~e)) [GB (~e)]

+ AF
0 (GA (~e)) [GA (~e)]

~eB
: (A27)
We then obtain
AF
0 (GA (~e)) [GA (~e)]

=
BF
0 (GB (~e)) [GB (~e)]

(~eA   ~eB)
(~eB   ~eA)
: (A28)
Substituting into (13) with j  B and  j  A and simplifying, we have
BF
0 (GB (~e)) [GB (~e)]

(1  2) = ~eB   ~eA: (A29)
Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to A yields
B(1  2)

[GB (~e)]

F 00 (GB (~e))
@GB (~e)
@A
+  [GB (~e)]
 1 @GB (~e)
@A
F 0 (GB (~e))

= ~e 1B
@~eB
@A
  ~e 1A
@~eA
@A
: (A30)
We also have
@GB (~e)
@A
= [GB (~e)]


~e B
@~eB
@A
+ ~e A
@~eA
@A

: (A31)
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Substituting into (A30) and factorizing by [GB (~e)]
2 1, we have
B(1  2) [GB (~e)]2 1 [F 00 (GB (~e))GB (~e) + F 0 (GB (~e))]

~e B
@~eB
@A
+ ~e A
@~eA
@A

= ~e 1B
@~eB
@A
  ~e 1A
@~eA
@A
: (A32)
Now, factorizing by F 0 (GB (~e)) and using  =  [F 00 (Gj (e)) :Gj (e)]=F 0 (Gj (e)) gives
B(1  2) [GB (~e)]2 1 F 0 (GB (~e)) [   ]

~e B
@~eB
@A
+ ~e A
@~eA
@A

= ~e 1B
@~eB
@A
  ~e 1A
@~eA
@A
: (A33)
Now, using (A29), we have
(~eB   ~eA) [GB (~e)] 1 [   ]

~e B
@~eB
@A
+ ~e A
@~eA
@A

= ~e 1B
@~eB
@A
  ~e 1A
@~eA
@A
: (A34)
Observing that [GB (~e)]
 1
= 1=

~e1 B + ~e
1 
A

, we have
(~eB   ~eA) (   )

~e B
@~eB
@A
+ ~e A
@~eA
@A

=
 
~e1 B + ~e
1 
A

~e 1B
@~eB
@A
  ~e 1A
@~eA
@A

: (A35)
We then have
@~eB
@A
=
"

 
~e1 B ~e
 1
A + 

+  (   )  ~eB~e A   
(   )  ~eA~e B   1+   1 + ~e1 A ~e 1B 
#
@~eA
@A
: (A36)
As for the decentralization system, we focus on a symmetric equilibrium i.e. mA = mB = m, which
implies A = B =  and ~eA = ~eB = ~e. The above expression then reduces to
@~eB
@A
j~eB=~eA =
 [2    (1  )]
2 +  (1  )
@~eA
@A
j~eA=~eB : (A37)
In addition, from (13), we also have in a symmetric equilibrium F 0 (G (~e)) [G (~e)] ~e  = 1= [ (1 + )].
Substituting this last expression into (14) (with mj = m) yields
m
 (1 + )
  2  
2

@~eA
@A
j~eA=~eB +

m
 (1 + )
  
2

@~eB
@A
j~eB=~eA = 0: (A38)
Finally, substituting (A37) into (A38) yields
[2m   (1 + ) (2  )] [2 +  (1  )] +  [2m   (1 + )] [2    (1  )] = 0: (A39)
The solution of this equation in  is thus given by (15) in Proposition 2.
(ii) It is immediately veried that ~ T m if  T ~ with ~  2= (1 + ).
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7.7 Welfare under decentralization and centralization
From (4) with F (G) = G1 , we can obtain the level of public investment in each region in the symmetric
equilibrium of a decentralized system, that is e =
h
 (1  ) (1 + ) 1 
i 1

. Substituting (7) into this
expression, we then obtain
e =
"
(1  ) [ (1  ) + ] (1 + ) 1 1 
+ 
m
# 1

: (A40)
We then obtain the following level of welfare for the median voter under a decentralized system,
 =  [(1 + ) + (1  )]
"
[(1  ) [ (1  ) + ]]1  (1 + ) 1 1 
+ 
m
# 1

: (A41)
Assuming that  = 0:5, we obtain (17) in the text.
Using (13) with F (G) = G1 , we obtain the level of public investment in each region in the symmetric
equilibrium of a centralized system, that is ~e =
h
~ (1  ) (1 + ) 1 1 
i 1

. Using (15), we then have
~e =
242 (1  )
h
2 +  (1  )2
i
(1 + )
1 
1 
4 +  (1  ) [2  (1 + )] m
35
1

: (A42)
We then obtain the following level of welfare for the median voter under a centralized system.
~ = 

4 + 2(1  ) [ +  (1  )]    1  2
264
h
2 (1  )
h
2 +  (1  )2
ii1 
(1 + )
1 
1 
4 +  (1  ) [2  (1 + )] m
375
1

:
(A43)
Assuming that  = 0:5, we obtain (18) in the text.
7.8 Proof of Proposition 3
(i) When  = 0, we have under a centralized system
~j=0 =

4 + (1  )2 4 + (1  2) (1 + ) 11 
4 [4 + (1  )]2 m
2; (A44)
while for  = 1, we have
~j=1 =
4

4 + (1  )2 (1 + ) 11 
[8 + (1  )2]2 m
2: (A45)
The welfare of each region under a decentralized system is still given by (17).
Hence, when  = 0, the welfare di¤erence between a centralized and a decentralized system is given
by
29
~j=0    =
3


 
3 + 2   2+ (1  2) (1 + ) 11 
[4 + (1  )]2 [1 + 2]2 m
2: (A46)
This expression is clearly positive for any  2 f[0; 1) ; (1;+1)g and  2 [0; 1].
When  = 1, the welfare di¤erence between a centralized and a decentralized system is given by
~j=1    =

422(1 + )(6   2   1) + 4(1  )2(3   1)  (1  )5 (1 + ) 2 1 
4
h
8 + (1  )2
i2
[1 + 2]
2
m2: (A47)
The sign of ~j=1    is the same as the sign of
  (; ) = 422(1 + )(6   2   1) + 4(1  )2(3   1)  (1  )5; (A48)
which is quadratic in . Thus   (; ) = 0 has two solutions given by
^ =   (1  )
2
2(1 + )
and ~ =
(1  )3
2(6   2   1) : (A49)
Clearly, ^ is negative while ~ is positive if only if 6   2   1  0 or   3  2p2.
Furthermore, the second derivative of   (; ) with respect to  is also positive if   3   2p2 and
negative if   3   2p2. Then, for   3   2p2,   (; ) reaches a global maximum and furthermore
0  ~  ^, which necessarily implies that   (; ) < 0 for any   0. When   3 2p2,   (; ) reaches
a global minimum and hence   (; ) is positive only if   ~  0  ^.
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 Figure 1 : The shape of reaction functions for σ < µ 
(Numerical values used: µ = 0.5; σ = 0.1; β = 0.5; θA = 1; θB =1.2) 
 
 
Figure 2 : The shape of reaction functions for σ > µ 
(Numerical values used: µ = 0.5; σ = 2; β = 0.5; θA = 1; θB = 2) 
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Abstract: In this appendix, we prove the existence of a (symmetric) Local Nash Perfect Equilibrium
(LNSPE) in pure strategies under both a decentralized system and a centralized system. We also show
the existence of a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in pure strategies under decentralization
and for a specic range of the parameters of the model.
1 Existence of a (Symmetric) Local Nash Subgame Perfect Equi-
librium (LNSPE)
1.1 Decentralization
The payo¤ for the region As median voter in the rst stage of the game under decentralization is given by
wA = mF [GA (e
 (A; B))] eA (A; B). The rst derivative of wA with respect to A after substituting
the equilibrium conditions of the policy stage (given by (4)) and eliminating the "" in order to reduce
the amount of notation is given by (6):
m
A
  1

@eA
@A
+
m
A
eAe
 
B
@eB
@A
: (B1)
The second derivative of wA with respect to A is thus given by
 m
2A
@eA
@A
+

m
A
  1

@2eA
@2A
+m
(
  1
2A
eAe
 
B
@eB
@A
+

A
e 1A e
 
B
@eA
@A
@eB
@A
  
A
eAe
  1
B

@eB
@A
2
+
1
A
eAe
 
B
@2eB
@2A
)
: (B2)
In a symmetric equilibrium with eA = eB = e, we have
 m
2A
@eA
@A
je +

m
A
  1

@2eA
@2A
je
+m
(
  1
2A
@eB
@A
je + e
 1
A

@eA
@A
je

@eB
@A
je

  e
 1
A

@eB
@A
je
2
+
1
A
@2eB
@2A
je
)
: (B3)
We have (from (A21)) (@eB=@A) je = [ (   ) = (+ )] (@eA=@A) je . Substituting into (B3), we
have
 m
2A
@eA
@A
je +

m
A
  1

@2eA
@2A
je
1
+m
(
  1
2A
 (   )
+ 
@eA
@A
je + e
 1
A
 (   )(1 + )
(+ )
2

@eA
@A
je
2
+
1
A
@2eB
@2A
je
)
: (B4)
Rearranging the terms, we have
m  A
A

@2eA
@2A
je + m
A
@2eB
@2A
je
 m
2A

(1 + ) [ (1  ) + ]
+ 

@eA
@A
je + me
 1
A
 (   ) (1 + )
(+ )
2

@eA
@A
je
2
: (B5)
We now determine (@2eB=@
2
A). We have (from (A20))
@eB
@A
= X(A)
@eA
@A
; with X(A)  (   ) eBe
 
A
e1 B + e
1 
A
: (B6)
We then have
@2eB
@2A
=
@X(A)
@A
@eA
@A
+ X(A)
@2eA
@2A
: (B7)
We have
@X(A)
@A
=
 (   ) Z(A)
e1 B + e
1 
A
2 with Z(A)  Z1(A)  Z2(A),
Z1  @U(A)
@A
V (A), Z2  U(A)@V (A)
@A
, U(A)  eBe A and V (A)  e1 B + e1 A : (B8)
We have,
@U(A)
@A
= e  1A

eA
@eB
@A
  eB @eA
@A

: (B9)
Substituting (B6) into this expression and rearranging the terms, we obtain
@U(A)
@A
= e  1A eB

 [(1  )  ] e1 A   e1 B
e1 B + e
1 
A

@eA
@A
: (B10)
We thus have
Z1(A) = e
  1
A eB

 [(1  )  ] e1 A   e1 B
 @eA
@A
: (B11)
We also have
@V (A)
@A
= (1  )

e B
@eB
@A
+ e A
@eA
@A

: (B12)
Substituting (B6) into this expression and rearranging the terms, we obtain
@V (A)
@A
= (1  )e A

 (2   ) e1 B + 2e1 A
e1 B + e
1 
A

@eA
@A
: (B13)
2
We thus have
Z2(A) = (1  )eBe 2A

 (2   ) e1 B + 2e1 A
e1 B + e
1 
A

@eA
@A
: (B14)
Using (B11) and (B14), we nd (after some tedious calculations)
Z(A)=  
eBe
  1
A

(1 + )e1 A e
1 
B + 
2e2 2A + e
2 2
B

e1 B + e
1 
A
@eA
@A
: (B15)
It follows that
@2eB
@2A
=
 (   ) Z(A)
e1 B + e
1 
A
2 @eA@A + X(A)@
2eA
@2A
: (B16)
with X(A) and Z(A) given by (B6) and (B15) respectively.
We now evaluate this derivative in a symmetric equilibrium. We rst have
X(A) je =  (   )
+ 
and Z(A) je =  
e1 2

(1 + ) + 2 + 

+ 
@eA
@A
je : (B17)
Hence, we have
@2eB
@2A
je =  
 (   ) (1 + ) + 2 +  e 1
[+ ]
3

@eA
@A
je
2
+
 (   )
+ 
@2eA
@2A
je (B18)
Substituting into (B5) and rearranging the terms, we can obtain after some tedious manipulations
m(1 + ) [(1  ) + ]  A (+ )
A (+ )

@2eA
@2A
je
 m
2A

(1 + ) [ (1  ) + ]
+ 

@eA
@A
je + m
3(   1)(   )(1 + )e 1
A (+ )
3

@eA
@A
je
2
: (B19)
In the symmetric equilibrium, we have A = 
 = (1 + ) [(1  ) + ]m= (+ ), and hence the
rst term is equal to 0. Observe also that the second term reduces to  (1=A) (@eA=@A) je . As a result
the second derivative of wA with respect to A in the symmetric equilibrium is nally given by
1
A
"
m3(   1)(   )(1 + )e 1
(+ )
3
@eA
@A
je   1
#
@eA
@A
je : (B20)
We also need to determine (@eA=@A) je . Rewrite the equilibrium conditions of the policy stage (given by
(4)) as and still eliminating the "" superscripts F (eA; eB(eA); A) = 0. Again, in the rst stage, the
median voter of each region anticipates the other-region representatives best-response in the second stage.
Applying the implicit function theorem, we have @eA=@A =  @F=@A= [@F=@eA + (@F=@eB) (@eB=@eA)].
F (eA; eB(eA); A) = 0 is given by
A(1  )

e1 A + e
1 
B
 
1  e A   1 = 0. (B21)
3
Hence, we have
@F
@A
= (1  ) e1 A + e1 B  1  e A . (B22)
Furthermore, we can easily obtain that
@F
@eA
=  A(1  )

e1 A + e
1 
B
 
1  1 e  1A

e1 A + e
1 
B

: (B23)
We also have
@F
@eB
= A(1  ) (   )

e1 A + e
1 
B
 
1  1 e A e
 
B : (B24)
From (B6), we have @eB=@eA =  (   ) eBe A =

e1 B + e
1 
A

, and then
@F
@eB
@eB
@eA
=
A(1  ) (   )2 2

e1 A + e
1 
B
 
1  1 e1 B e
 2
A
e1 B + e
1 
A
: (B25)
Hence, we have @eA=@A =  @F=@A= [@F=@eA + (@F=@eB) (@eB=@eA)], or
@eA
@A
=
eA
 
e1 A + e
1 
B
  
e1 B + e
1 
A

A

e1 A e
1 
B ((1  2) + 22) + (e2 2A + e2 2B )
 : (B26)
In the symmetric equilibrium, we have
@eA
@A
je = e(+ )
A [(1  ) + 2] : (B27)
Substituting into (B20), we have
1
A
"
m3(   1)(   )(1 + )
A (+ )
2
[(1  ) + 2]   1
#
@eA
@A
je : (B28)
In the symmetric equilibrium, we have A = 
 = (1 + ) [(1  ) + ]m= (+ ). Thus the above
expression reduces to
1
A

3(   1)(   )
(+ ) [(1  ) + 2] [(1  ) + ]   1

@eA
@A
je : (B29)
This expression is negative, which implies that @2wA=@
2
A < 0 in A = 
, if
	 (; ; )  
3(   1)(   )
(+ ) [(1  ) + 2] [(1  ) + ] < 1: (B30)
Note rst that this inequality is always veried for  2 [; 1). We also have
@	
@
=
2(   1)(   )  (8  5) + 522 + 2(1  )(3  )
(+ )
2
[(1  ) + 2]2 [(1  ) + ]2 : (B31)
which is strictly positive for  =2 [; 1). In this case, 	 is increasing in  and reaches a maximum
4
in  = 1, i.e. 	 j=1 = (   1)(   )= [2(+ )]. We have that 	 j=1 < 1 for any  >  
(1=2)
h
 (3+ 1) +
p
92 + 10+ 1
i
.  is itself increasing in  and reaches a maximum in  = 1 in
which case  j=1 =
p
5  2. Therefore a su¢ cient condition for 	 < 1 is that   p5  2 ' 0:24. This
implies that the second derivative of wA with respect to A in A = 
 is strictly negative, thus proving
the existence of a symmetric Local Nash Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (LNSPE) in pure strategies under
a decentralized system. (Note that when  = 0:5, as it is assumed in Section 5, we have  j=1 =
(1=4)
p
33  5, as stated in Footnote 28).
1.2 Centralization
The payo¤ for the region As median voter in the rst stage of the game under decentralization is given
by wA = mF [Gj (~e (A; B))]  [(2  )~ej (A; B) + ~e j (A; B)] =2. From the equilibrium conditions
in the second stage we have using (A29) and omitting the "tilde" to reduce the amount of notation:
F 0 (GA (e)) [GA (e)]

= (eA   eB) =

A(1  2)
 K(A) Using (14), the rst derivative of wA with
respect to A can be rewritten as .
mK(A)

e A
@eA
@A
+ e B
@eB
@A

  12

(2  ) @eA
@A
+ 
@eB
@A

= 0: (B32)
The second derivative of wA with respect to A is thus given by
Y1(A) + Y2(A) + Y3(A), with
Y1(A) = m
@K(A)
@A

e A
@eA
@A
+ e B
@eB
@A

;
Y2(A) = mK(A)
"
 e  1A

@eA
@A
2
+ e A
@2eA
@2A
  e  1B

@eB
@A
2
+ e B
@2eB
@2A
#
;
Y3(A) =  1
2

(2  ) @
2eA
@2A
+ 
@2eB
@2A

: (B33)
We rst have
@K(A)
@A
=
1
(1  2)2A

e 1A
@eA
@A
  e 1B
@eB
@A

A   (eA   eB)

: (B34)
In a symmetric equilibrium, we have K(A) je = e= [A(1 + )] and
@K(A)
@A
je = 1
(1  2)2A

e 1A

@eA
@A
je    @eB
@A
je

  e (1  )

: (B35)
We have (from (A37)) (@eB=@A) je = f [2   (1  )] = [2 + (1  )]g (@eA=@A) je . Substituting
into the above expression, we can obtain
@K(A)
@A
je =
e 1

2 + 
 
1 + 2

A(1 + ) [2 +  (1  )]
@eA
@A
je   e

2A(1 + )
: (B36)
5
We also have in the symmetric equilibrium

e A
@eA
@A
+ e B
@eB
@A

je =
e (1 + )
h
2 +  (1  )2
i
2 +  (1  )
@eA
@A
je : (B37)
Substituting (B36) and (B37) into Y1(A) and simplifying, we have
Y1(A) je =
me 1

2 + 
 
1 + 2
 h
2 +  (1  )2
i
A [2 +  (1  )]2

@eA
@A
je
2
 
m
h
2 +  (1  )2
i
2A [2 +  (1  )]
@eA
@A
je : (B38)
Regarding Y2(A) in the symmetric equilibrium, we have
Y2(A) =
m
A(1 + )
"
 e 1
"
@eA
@A
je
2
+ 

@eB
@A
je
2#
+
@2eA
@2A
je +  @
2eB
@2A
je
#
: (B39)
Using (@eB=@A) je = f [2   (1  )] = [2 + (1  )]g (@eA=@A) je , we can obtain
Y2(A) je =   me
 1
A(1 + )
[2 +  (1  )]2 + 3 [2    (1  )]2
[2 +  (1  )]2

@eA
@A
je
2
+
m
A(1 + )

@2eA
@2A
je +  @
2eB
@2A
je

: (B40)
Regarding Y3(A) in the symmetric equilibrium is given by
Y3(A) je =  1
2

(2  ) @
2eA
@2A
je + @
2eB
@2A
je

: (B41)
We therefore need to characterize (@2eB=@
2
A). We have (from (A36))
@eB
@A
= X(A)
@eA
@A
; with X(A)

 
e1 B e
 1
A + 

+  (   )  eBe A   
(   )  eAe B   1+   1 + e1 A e 1B  : (B42)
We then have
@2eB
@2A
=
@X(A)
@A
@eA
@A
+ X(A)
@2eA
@2A
: (B43)
We have
@X(A)
@A
=
Z(A)
(   )  eAe B   1+   1 + e1 A e 1B 2
with Z(A)  Z1(A)  Z2(A), Z1(A)  @U(A)
@A
V (A), Z2(A)  U(A)@V (A)
@A
,
and where U(A) and V (A) correspond to the numerator and to the denominator ofX(A) respectively.(B44)
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We have
@U(A)
@A
= 

(1  ) e B e 1A + (   ) e 1B e A
 @eB
@A
  (1  ) e 2A e1 B + (   ) e  1A eB @eA@A : (B45)
In a symmetric equilibrium, we have
@U(A)
@A
je = e 1 (1  )

@eB
@A
je   @eA
@A
je

: (B46)
Again, we have (@eB=@A) je = f [2   (1  )] = [2 + (1  )]g (@eA=@A) je . It follows that
@U(A)
@A
je =  
 (1  )  1  2 e 1
2 +  (1  )
@eA
@A
je : (B47)
We also have V (A) je = [2 +  (1  )]. It follows that
Z1(A) je =  

 (1  )  1  2 e 1 @eA
@A
je : (B48)
We also have
@V (A)
@A
= 

(   ) e 1A e B + (1  ) e A e 1B
 @eA
@A
  (   ) eAe  1B + (1  ) e1 A e 2B  @eB@A : (B49)
In a symmetric equilibrium, we have
@V (A)
@A
je = e 1 (1  )

@eA
@A
je   @eB
@A
je

: (B50)
It follows that
@V (A)
@A
je =
 (1  )  1  2 e 1
2 +  (1  )
@eA
@A
je : (B51)
We also have U(A) je =  [2    (1  )]. It follows that
Z2(A) je =
 (1  )  1  2 [2    (1  )] e 1
2 +  (1  )
@eA
@A
je (B52)
As a result, we have
Z(A) je =  
 (1  )  1  2 h4 +  (1  )2i e 1
2 +  (1  )
@eA
@A
je : (B53)
And then, we have
@X(A)
@A
je =  
 (1  )  1  2 h4 +  (1  )2i e 1
[2 +  (1  )]3
@eA
@A
je : (B54)
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Finally, we have in a symmetric equilibrium
@2eB
@2A
je =  
 (1  )  1  2 h4 +  (1  )2i e 1
[2 +  (1  )]3

@eA
@A
je
2
+
 [2    (1  )]
2 +  (1  )
@2eA
@2A
je :(B55)
Substituting intoY2(A) given by (B40) and simplifying, we can obtain after some tedious manipulations,
Y2(A) je =   me
 1
A(1 + )
 (; ; )
[2 +  (1  )]3

@eA
@A
je
2
+
m
h
2 +  (1  )2
i
A [2 +  (1  )]
@2eA
@2A
je
where
 (; ; )  [2 +  (1  )]
h
[2 +  (1  )]2 + 3 [2    (1  )]2
i
+2 (1  )  1  2 h4 +  (1  )2i : (B56)
Substituting (B55) into Y3(A) given by (B41) and simplifying, we can also obtain (still after some
tedious calculations),
Y3(A) je = 
2
 (1  )  1  2 h4 +  (1  )2i e 1
[2 +  (1  )]3

@eA
@A
je
2
 1
2
[4 +  (1  ) [2  (1 + )]]
2 +  (1  )
@2eA
@2A
je : (B57)
Now, using (B38), (B56) and (B57), we have that the second derivative of wA with respect to A is thus
given by
me 1

2 + 
 
1 + 2
 h
2 +  (1  )2
i
A [2 +  (1  )]2

@eA
@A
je
2
 
m
h
2 +  (1  )2
i
2A [2 +  (1  )]
@eA
@A
je
  me
 1
A(1 + )
 (; ; )
[2 +  (1  )]3

@eA
@A
je
2
+
m
h
2 +  (1  )2
i
A [2 +  (1  )]
@2eA
@2A
je

2
 (1  )  1  2 h4 +  (1  )2i e 1
[2 +  (1  )]3

@eA
@A
je
2
 1
2
[4 +  (1  ) [2  (1 + )]]
2 +  (1  )
@2eA
@2A
je : (B58)
Rearranging the terms, we have8>>>>><>>>>>:
me 1

2 + 
 
1 + 2
 h
2 +  (1  )2
i
A [2 +  (1  )]2
  me
 1 (; ; )
A(1 + ) [2 +  (1  )]3
+

2
 (1  )  1  2 h4 +  (1  )2i e 1
[2 +  (1  )]3
9>>>>>=>>>>>;

@eA
@A
je
2
8
24m
h
2 +  (1  )2
i
A [2 +  (1  )]  
1
2
[4 +  (1  ) [2  (1 + )]]
2 +  (1  )
35 @2eA
@2A
je
 
m
h
2 +  (1  )2
i
2A [2 +  (1  )]
@eA
@A
je : (B59)
Simplifying, we have8<: me 1	 (; ; )A(1 + ) [2 +  (1  )]3 + 2
 (1  )  1  2 h4 +  (1  )2i e 1
[2 +  (1  )]3
9=;

@eA
@A
je
2
242
h
2 +  (1  )2
i
m  A [4 +  (1  ) [2  (1 + )]]
2A [2 +  (1  )]
35 @2eA
@2A
je
 
m
h
2 +  (1  )2
i
2A [2 +  (1  )]
@eA
@A
je ;
where	 (; ; ) = (1+)

2 + 
 
1 + 2
 h
2 +  (1  )2
i
[2 +  (1  )]  (; ; ) :(B60)
In the symmetric equilibrium, we have A = ~ = 2
h
2 +  (1  )2
i
m= [4 +  (1  ) [2  (1 + )]],
and hence the second term of (B60) in front of
 
@2eA=@
2
A
 je 2 is equal to 0.
Furthermore, simplifying 	 (; ; ), we nd (after long and tedious calculations)
	 (; ; ) =  (1 + )
h
4 +  (1  )2
i 
2 + 
 
1  2  (1  ) : (B61)
Therefore, (B60) reduces to8>>>>><>>>>>:
me 1
h
4 +  (1  )2
i 
2 + 
 
1  2  (1  )
A [2 +  (1  )]3
+

2
 (1  )  1  2 h4 +  (1  )2i e 1
[2 +  (1  )]3
9>>>>>=>>>>>;

@eA
@A
je
2
 
m
h
2 +  (1  )2
i
2A [2 +  (1  )]
@eA
@A
je : (B62)
Simplifying again, we have8<:e
 1
h
4 +  (1  )2
i

 (; ; ; ;m; A)
2A [2 +  (1  )]3
@eA
@A
je  
m
h
2 +  (1  )2
i
2A [2 +  (1  )]
9=; @eA@A je ;
where 
 (; ; ; ;m; A) = 2m

2 + 
 
1  2   (1  )+ A (1  )  1  2. (B63)
Therefore, we need to determine (@eA=@A) je . Rewrite the equilibrium conditions of the policy stage
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(given by (13)) as F (eA; eB(eA); A) = 0. Again, in the rst stage, the median voter of each region antic-
ipates the other-region representatives best-response in the second stage. Applying the implicit function
theorem, we have @eA=@A =  @F=@A= [@F=@eA + (@FA=@eB) (@eB=@eA)]. F (eA; eB(eA); A) = 0 is
given by
A(1  )

e1 A + e
1 
B
 
1  e A + B(1  )

e1 B + e
1 
A
 
1  e A   1 = 0: (B64)
We have
@F
@A
= (1  ) e1 A + e1 B  1  e A : (B65)
In a symmetric equilibrium, it reduces to
@F
@A
je = (1  ) (1 + )
 
1  e : (B66)
We also have,
@F
@eA
= A(1  )

(   ) e1 A + e1 B  1  1 e 2A    e1 A + e1 B  1  e  1A 
+B(1  )

 (   ) e1 B + e1 A  1  1 e 2A    e1 B + e1 A  1  e  1A  : (B67)
In a symmetric equilibrium, it reduces to
@F
@eA
je =  (1  ) (1 + )
 
1  1 2 +   1 + 2 e  1: (B68)
We also have,
@F
@eB
= A(1  ) (   )

e1 A + e
1 
B
 
1  1 e B e
 
A
+B(1  ) (   )

e1 B + e
1 
A
 
1  1 e B e
 
A : (B69)
In a symmetric equilibrium, it reduces to
@F
@eB
je = 2(1  ) (   ) (1 + )
 
1  1 e  1: (B70)
Furthermore, from (B42), we have (@eB=@eA) je = [ [2    (1  )]] = [2 +  (1  )]. Using this
expression with (B68) and (B70), we have that
@F
@eA
je +

@F
@eB
je

@eB
@eA
je

=  (1  ) (1 + )
 
1  1 e  1 (; ; )
2 +  (1  ) ;
where  (; ; ) =

2 + 
 
1 + 2

[2 +  (1  )]  22 (   ) [2    (1  )] : (B71)
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Simplifying, we obtain  (; ; ) =  (1 + )
h
4 +  (1  )2
i
. Hence using (B66) and (B71), we
obtain that (@eA=@A) je =   (@F=@A) je = [(@F=@eA) je + (@FA=@eB) je (@eB=@eA) je ], or
@eA
@A
je = [2 +  (1  )] e

h
4 +  (1  )2
i : (B72)
Substituting this expression in (B63), we can obtain8<:
 (; ; ; ;m; A)22 [2 +  (1  )]2  
m
h
2 +  (1  )2
i
2 [2 +  (1  )]
9=; @eA@A je : (B73)
Using the denition of 
 (; ; ; ;m; A) in (B63) with A =  the above expression reduce
  (; ; ; m; )
22 [2 +  (1  )]2
@eA
@A
je ;
where   (; ; ;m; )  (1  )(1  2)+
2m
n


2 + 
 
1  2  (1  )  h2 +  (1  )2i [2 +  (1  )]o : (B74)
Simplifying, we obtain
  (; ; ;m; ) =  2m
h
2 (2 + 1  ) + 2 (1  )3 + 3 (1  )2
i
+(1 )(1 2):(B75)
Substituting  = ~ = 2
h
2 +  (1  )2
i
m= [4 +  (1  ) [2  (1 + )]] into this expression, it
becomes negative which implies that @2wA=@
2
A < 0 in  = ~, ifh
2 (2 + 1  ) + 2 (1  )3 + 3 (1  )2
i
[4 +  (1  ) [2  (1 + )]] >
(1  )(1  2)
h
2 +  (1  )2
i
: (B76)
A su¢ cient condition for this inequality to be satised is that the two terms in [:] of the left-hand side
(LHS) of this inequality are larger than the two terms in [:] of the right-hand side (RHS). First observe that
[4 +  (1  ) [2  (1 + )]] 
h
2 +  (1  )2
i
; since it reduces to 2 +  (1  ) (1   2)  0,
which is always satised. Now, a su¢ cient condition for the rst term of the LHS to be larger than that of
the RHS is that
h
2 (2 + 1  ) + 2 (1  )3 + 3 (1  )2
i
 (1 )(1 2) since   1. Rear-
ranging the terms, this inequality can be rewritten as 2 (1  )3+ [2 + (1  ) [2(2  )  1]]  0.
A su¢ cient condition for this last inequality to be satised is that    = 1= [2(2  )].  is increasing
in  and hence reach a maximum in  = 1, in which case  = 1=2. We exclude the situation with
 = 0 together with  = 1, since no public goods are supplied in this case. Hence, for   0:5 the two
inequalities are strict. Hence, a su¢ cient condition for the second derivative of wA with respect to A in
A = ~ to be strictly negative is that   0:5, thus proving the the existence of a symmetric Local Nash
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (LNSPE) in pure strategies under a centralized system.
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2 Existence of a (Symmetric) Subgame Perfect Nash Equilib-
rium (SPNE) under a Decentralized System
Under a decentralized system, one can nevertheless show the existence of a (symmetric) Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in pure strategies for  = 0,  =  and  2 (; 1).
2.1 Decentralization
2.1.1 The case of  = 0 or  = 
 =  corresponds to the model analyzed by Besley and Coate (2003) and others. In this case, the
utility of a citizen in region j is separable in the levels of local public investments and is given by
xj + 

e1 j + e
1 
 j

. As explained in the paper, this implies that there are no strategic interactions
in public spending. In other words, in the second stage of the game, the equilibrium is in dominant
strategies and the level of local public investment in a particular region only depends on the identity
of its representative. In turn, in the rst stage of the game, each median voter has (also) a dominant
strategy which is to appoint herself as the regions representative.
 = 0 corresponds to the model analyzed by Dur and Roelfsema (2005) in their appendix, or Buccholz
et al. (2005), among many others. Under this specic assumption, the utility of a citizen  in region j is
given by xj+ [ej + e j ]
1 . This summation technologyimplies that there is perfect substitutability
between local public investments. The rst-order (and su¢ cient) conditions for an equilibrium in the
second stage of the game are given by j(1  ) [ej + e j ]  = 1 for j = A;B. Solving this system, we
have ej =
h
(1  )1= =  1  2i h1=j   1= j i. We then have that Gj = ej + e j = [(1  ) j ]1=.
Substituting ej and G

j into the utility of the median voter given by mG
1 
j   ej , we obtain that it is
separable in j and in  j . It follows that each median has a dominant strategy in this case as well.
Therefore, the SPNE always exists for  = 0 or  = .
2.1.2 The case of  2 (; 1): Strategic Complementarity
The payo¤for the regionAs median voter in the rst stage of the game is given by wA = mF [GA (e (A; B))] 
eA (A; B). The rst derivative of wA with respect to A after substituting the equilibrium conditions
of the policy stage (given by (4)) is given by (6) or
@wA
@A
=
1
A

(m  A)@e

A
@A
+ meA e
 
B
@eB
@A

:
We also have
@eB
@A
=

(   )eBe A
e1 B + e
1 
A

@eA
@A
:
Substituting into the rst expression, we obtain
@wA
@A
=
Y (eA; e

B ;m; A)
A

e1 B + e
1 
A
 @eA
@A
;
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with Y (eA; e

B ;m; A) =

(m  A) +m2(   )

e1 B +  (m  A) e1 A
In the symmetric equilibrium eA = e

B and Y (e

A; e

B ;m; A) = 0 for satisfying the rst-order conditions
in the policy stage yields  given by (7), i.e.  = (1 + ) [(1  ) + ]m= (+ ). Suppose that
B = 
. For the quasi-concavity of wA with respect to A, the plan is to show that Y (eA; e

B ;m; A) > 0
for A < 
 and Y (eA; e

B ;m; A) < 0 for A > 
.
When  > , we have that  > m. Suppose rst hat A <  which leads to eA < e

B . Indeed, as
shown in the previous section of this appendix, the equilibrium level of public investment in one region is
increasing in the type of its representative (see equation (B26)). When  > , local public investments
are strategic complements and, so, the level of public investment in the other region decreases as well.
But it decreases by a lower extent since the slope of each best-response function is lower than 1 at the
equilibrium point (which can be seen in Figure 2).
If A < m < 
, then Y (eA; e

B ;m; A) is obviously positive. If m < A < 
, then (m  A) is
negative and Y (eA; e

B ;m; A) can be positive only if (m   A) + m2(   ) > 0, that is only if
A < ^ where ^ = (m=)


 
1  2+ 2. For any  > , we can easily verify that ^ > , which
implies that (m  A) +m2(   ) is positive for any A < . Now, observe that Y (eA; eB ;m; A) >
(m  A) +m2(   ) +  (m  A)

e1 A when  2 (; 1) since eA < eB . The term in [:] in the
previous expression is positive if
(A  m) < m
2(   )
+ 
= (  m)
which is always veried for A < 
. It follows that Y (eA; e

B ;m; A) is positive for any A < 
 when
 2 (; 1).
Suppose now that A > 
 and  > m since  >  which leads to eA > e

B . If A > ^ > 
 > m,
then (m  A) and (m  A) +m2(   ) are both negative and Y (eA; eB ;m; A) is thus negative as
well. If ^ > A > 
 > m, then (m  A) +m2( ) is positive (and (m  A) is still negative). Now,
observe that Y (eA; e

B ;m; A) <

(m  A) +m2(   ) +  (m  A)

e1 A when  2 (; 1) since
eA > e

B . The term in [:] in the previous expression is negative if
(A  m) > m
2(   )
+ 
= (  m)
which is always veried for A > 
. It follows that Y (eA; e

B ;m; A) is negative for any A > 
 when
 2 (; 1).
As result each median voters payo¤ is quasi-concave, which implies that a symmetric SPNE exists
for  2 (; 1). Unfortunately, the same type of reasoning does not apply for  =2 (; 1).
2.2 Centralization
Showing the existence of a SPNE in pure strategies in the case of a centralized system is even more
problematic, except for the very specic cases of  =  i.e. separability of local public goods in the
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utility of voters and  = 0 i.e. perfect substitutability between local public investments.
For  = 0, the joint public good surplus is given by j [ej + e j ]
1 
+ j [e j + ej ]
1  (ej+e j).
The rst-order (and su¢ cient) conditions for an equilibrium in the second stage of the game are thus
given by j(1   ) [ej + e j ]  +  j(1   ) [e j + ej ]  = 1 for j = A;B. Solving this system,
we can obtain ~ej =
h
[(1  ) (1 + )]1= =  1  2i h1=j   1= j i. We then have that ~Gj = ~ej +
~e j = [(1  ) (1 + )j ]1=. Substituting ~ej and ~Gj into the utility of the median voter given by
m ~G1 j   (1=2) [(2  ) ~ej + ~e j ], we obtain that it is separable in j and in  j . It follows that each
median has a dominant strategy and therefore a SPNE in pure strategies exists in this case.
For  = , the payo¤ of each median induced by the public good provision subgame is no longer
separable in the types of the two representatives. Yet, as shown by Besley and Coate (2003), there exists
a SPNE in pure strategies in this case as well (see the Proof of Lemma 3, pp. 2631-35).
14
